So argues Efraim Inbar, who advocates that Israel continue its strategy of “mowing the grass”—i.e., fighting a long, episodic war of attrition against its terrorist enemy in Gaza:

[I]t is a mistake to believe that it is possible to root Hamas out of Gaza and destroy its capabilities once and for all. There is no one-shot solution to the military and terrorist challenge Hamas poses.

Despite assertions to the contrary by the Israeli right, the end of Hamas rule is not an easily attainable military objective. The roots of Hamas are deep in Palestinian society, particularly in Gaza. . . . Hamas simply cannot be eradicated by outsiders conquering Gaza and then politically reengineering Palestinian society. . . . Even if Hamas rule could be terminated, its civilian infrastructure would continue to exist.

The calls from the Israeli left for a “political solution” are similarly unrealistic. Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Salafist groups see Israel as a theological aberration. They might reluctantly accept temporary cease-fires, but they continue to reject categorically any diplomatic course of action intended to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. . . .

Israel will probably be engaged in a war of attrition against Hamas for a long time. Keeping the enemy off-balance and reducing its capabilities will require Israeli military readiness and a willingness to use force intermittently, while maintaining a healthy and resilient Israeli home front despite the protracted conflict.

Robert Satloff has some harsh words for the U.S. government in this regard, words I take especially seriously because Satloff is someone inclined to political moderation. Why, he asks, have American diplomats failed to achieve anything in their endless rounds of talks in Doha and Cairo? Because

there is simply not enough pressure on Hamas to change course, accept a deal, and release the remaining October 7 hostages, stuck in nightmarish captivity. . . . In this environment, why should Hamas change course?

Publicly, the U.S. should bite the bullet and urge Israel to complete the main battle operations in Gaza—i.e., the Rafah operation—as swiftly and efficiently as possible. We should be assertively assisting with the humanitarian side of this.

Satloff had more to say about the hostages, especially the five American ones, in a speech he gave recently:

I am ashamed—ashamed of how we have allowed the story of the hostages to get lost in the noise of the war that followed their capture; ashamed of how we have permitted their release to be a bargaining chip in some larger political negotiation; ashamed of how we have failed to give them the respect and dignity and our wholehearted demand for Red Cross access and care and medicine that is our normal, usual demand for hostages.

If they were taken by Boko Haram, everyone would know their name. If they were taken by the Taliban, everyone would tie a yellow ribbon around a tree for them. If they were taken by Islamic State, kids would learn about them in school.

It is repugnant to see their freedom as just one item on the bargaining table with Hamas, as though they were chattel. These are Americans—and they deserve to be backed by the full faith and credit of the United States.