Earlier this week, two boats set sail from Barcelona in an attempt to break the blockade on the Gaza Strip. One had to return to port due to technical problems; the other was peaceably diverted by the Israeli navy. Having perused the social-media accounts of passengers aboard the “Women’s Boat to Gaza,” Liel Leibovitz concludes that this was something other than a mission of well-intentioned do-gooders:

[These are people] whose moral compasses guide them straight into the arms of murderers who execute gays, oppress women, and spend every penny they get on planning and executing terrorist attacks. Like Ola Abed: she’s one of the people behind “Gaza Man,” a video game that encourages kids to shoot as many Israelis as they can, with extra points given for headshots. Too callous for your taste? Head over to Abed’s Facebook page and enjoy her frequent expressions of support for murderous attacks on Israeli civilians, or sample her Twitter feed for a taste of more uplifting calls for peace and love, like the hashtag #GiveUsWeapons. . . .

Norsham Abu Bakr, . . . a Muslim Brotherhood supporter, has palled around with Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and has waxed poetic on her Facebook page, sharing posts that accuse the Mossad of orchestrating the recent terrorist attacks in Munich and Nice. . . .

[I]f you seriously support a resolution to the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, [be glad] that the Israeli navy [brought] this hateful journey to a peaceful end.

While the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has never been friendly to Hamas, his government has objected strenuously to the Israeli campaign in the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip. Haisam Hassanein explains why:

Cairo has long been playing a double game, holding Hamas terrorists near while simultaneously trying to appear helpful to the United States and Israel. Israel taking control of Rafah threatens Egypt’s ability to exploit the chaos in Gaza, both to generate profits for regime insiders and so Cairo can pose as an indispensable mediator and preserve access to U.S. money and arms.

Egyptian security officials have looked the other way while Hamas and other Palestinian militants dug tunnels on the Egyptian-Gaza border. That gave Cairo the ability to use the situation in Gaza as a tool for regional influence and to ensure Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would not be eclipsed by regional competitors such as Qatar and Turkey.

Some elements close to the Sisi regime have benefited from Hamas control over Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Media reports indicate an Egyptian company run by one of Sisi’s close allies is making hundreds of millions of dollars by taxing Gazans fleeing the current conflict.

Moreover, writes Judith Miller, the Gaza war has been a godsend to the entire Egyptian economy, which was in dire straits last fall. Since October 7, the International Monetary Fund has given the country a much-needed injection of cash, since the U.S. and other Western countries believe it is a necessary intermediary and stabilizing force. Cairo therefore sees the continuation of the war, rather than an Israeli victory, as most desirable. Hassanein concludes:

Adding to its financial incentive, the Sisi regime views the Rafah crossing as a crucial card in preserving Cairo’s regional standing. Holding it increases Egypt’s relevance to countries that want to send aid to the Palestinians and ensures Washington stays quiet about Egypt’s gross human-rights violations so it can maintain a stable flow of U.S. assistance and weaponry. . . . No serious effort to turn the page on Hamas will yield the desired results without cutting this umbilical cord between the Sisi regime and Hamas.