In 2000, then-President Bill Clinton presented Ehud Barak and Yasir Arafat with a plan for the creation of a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank, based on a near-complete Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 lines with land-swaps allowing Israel to retain the major settlement blocs. Since then, these guidelines have been treated by politicians and diplomats in Israel and elsewhere as the natural solution to the conflict. Gershon Hacohen argues that, since much has changed since the turn of the century, it’s time for a new approach:

The [basic purpose of] the Oslo Accords, [an] end to Israeli control over Palestinian citizens, [has] largely been realized. It was already so in January 1996, when Israel concluded the withdrawal of its forces from the populated territories of the West Bank. The Palestinian population living in [what the agreement designated as] Areas A and B, or approximately 90 percent of the total Palestinian population of the West Bank, has been controlled since then by the Palestinian Authority (PA). . . .

[Now] the Israeli government must re-clarify the complex of security interests inherent in Israel’s control over Area C. In this reexamination, Israel must depart from the idea of two states as [generally understood]. . . . An Israeli reassessment has the potential to introduce a change in Jerusalem’s position by renewing its demand for the preservation of a defensible area, which depends on consistent Israeli hold over Area C. . . .

Senior security officials who support withdrawal [from the remainder of the West Bank] assure the public that the army would be able to meet the country’s security challenges even with withdrawal to the 1967 lines. Their position ignores important changes that have taken place. If, after the withdrawal, the West Bank is taken over by an organization similar to Hamas in Gaza—Hizballah, in all likelihood—the IDF would struggle to provide an adequate response to the possibility of simultaneous attack on Israel on several fronts. These officials claim that even after uprooting the Jewish residents, the IDF would be able to operate throughout the area. But they ignore the level of forces that would be required for this undertaking. Without the mass presence of a Jewish population, the IDF will be defeated, and will withdraw as it did from south Lebanon in May 2000. . . .

In short, without a constant hold on the whole of Area C, Israel has no defensible borders. The way Yitzḥak Rabin delineated the expanse of Area C demonstrates his farsighted understanding of the importance of those areas beyond the 1967 borders, which must be in Israel’s full control. It is time to emphasize that there is more than one way to realize the two-state logic. It is [thus] in Israel’s security interests that it embark on full-scale construction in Area C.

For some time, opponents of U.S support for Israel have been urging the White House to end the war in Gaza, or simply calling for a ceasefire. Douglas Feith and Lewis Libby consider what such a result would actually entail:

Ending the war immediately would allow Hamas to survive and retain military and governing power. Leaving it in the area containing the Sinai-Gaza smuggling routes would ensure that Hamas can rearm. This is why Hamas leaders now plead for a ceasefire. A ceasefire will provide some relief for Gazans today, but a prolonged ceasefire will preserve Hamas’s bloody oppression of Gaza and make future wars with Israel inevitable.

For most Gazans, even when there is no hot war, Hamas’s dictatorship is a nightmarish tyranny. Hamas rule features the torture and murder of regime opponents, official corruption, extremist indoctrination of children, and misery for the population in general. Hamas diverts foreign aid and other resources from proper uses; instead of improving life for the mass of the people, it uses the funds to fight against Palestinians and Israelis.

Moreover, a Hamas-affiliated website warned Gazans last month against cooperating with Israel in securing and delivering the truckloads of aid flowing into the Strip. It promised to deal with those who do with “an iron fist.” In other words, if Hamas remains in power, it will begin torturing, imprisoning, or murdering those it deems collaborators the moment the war ends. Thereafter, Hamas will begin planning its next attack on Israel:

Hamas’s goals are to overshadow the Palestinian Authority, win control of the West Bank, and establish Hamas leadership over the Palestinian revolution. Hamas’s ultimate aim is to spark a regional war to obliterate Israel and, as Hamas leaders steadfastly maintain, fulfill a Quranic vision of killing all Jews.

Hamas planned for corpses of Palestinian babies and mothers to serve as the mainspring of its October 7 war plan. Hamas calculated it could survive a war against a superior Israeli force and energize enemies of Israel around the world. The key to both aims was arranging for grievous Palestinian civilian losses. . . . That element of Hamas’s war plan is working impressively.