Last Monday, a surprising number of Ḥaredim broke with precedent to join their countrymen in marking Yom Hazikaron—the solemn day on which Israelis remember their fallen soldiers and victims of terrorism. This, writes Evelyn Gordon, taken together with recent survey data, suggests that divisions within Israeli society are becoming less profound:

Ḥaredim traditionally had two problems with Memorial Day, which falls one day before Independence Day. First, it’s an Israeli holiday rather than a Jewish one, and therefore uncomfortable for a community whose leaders have long viewed the secular Jewish state and its army with suspicion and even hostility. Second, many of the day’s specific observances—like the siren heralding a moment of silence or the wreaths laid on graves—are imported from non-Jewish customs. Ḥaredim, reasonably enough, feel a Jewish state should mark its mostly Jewish dead in a more Jewish fashion.

This year, however, was notably different. Although the main ḥaredi newspapers continued to ignore Memorial Day, leading ḥaredi websites and radio stations devoted extensive coverage to it, including feature stories on ḥaredi soldiers who fell in battle. Every Knesset member from the more moderate ḥaredi party (Shas) planned to attend Memorial Day ceremonies, and the head of the more extreme ḥaredi party (United Torah Judaism) even served as the state’s official representative at one such ceremony, down to laying a wreath at a military cemetery. . . . Ḥaredim also organized their own Memorial Day initiatives . . .

Like Israeli Arabs, Ḥaredim have no interest in assimilating into mainstream [Israeli] culture. And as in the Arab community, anti-Israel extremists haven’t disappeared. But, increasingly, Ḥaredim seek to integrate while retaining their own culture, and thereby to make their own unique contribution to the Jewish state.

On Tuesday, representatives of Hamas met with their counterparts from Fatah—the faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) once led by Yasir Arafat that now governs parts of the West Bank—in Beijing to discuss possible reconciliation. While it is unlikely that these talks will yield any more progress than the many previous rounds, they constitute a significant step in China’s increasing attempts to involve itself in the Middle East on the side of Israel’s enemies.

By contrast, writes Tuvia Gering, Taiwan has been quick and consistent in its condemnations of Hamas and Iran and its expressions of sympathy with Israel:

Support from Taipei goes beyond words. Taiwan’s appointee in Tel Aviv and de-facto ambassador, Abby Lee, has been busy aiding hostage families, adopting the most affected kibbutzim in southern Israel, and volunteering with farmers. Taiwan recently pledged more than half a million dollars to Israel for critical initiatives, including medical and communications supplies for local municipalities. This follows earlier aid from Taiwan to an organization helping Israeli soldiers and families immediately after the October 7 attack.

The reasons why are not hard to fathom:

In many ways, Taiwan sees a reflection of itself in Israel—two vibrant democracies facing threats from hostile neighbors. Both nations wield substantial economic and technological prowess, and both heavily depend on U.S. military exports and diplomacy. Taipei also sees Israel as a “role model” for what Taiwan should aspire to be, citing its unwavering determination and capabilities to defend itself.

On a deeper level, Taiwanese leaders seem to view Israel’s war with Hamas and Iran as an extension of a greater struggle between democracy and autocracy.

Gering urges Israel to reciprocate these expressions of friendship and to take into account that “China has been going above and beyond to demonize the Jewish state in international forums.” Above all, he writes, Jerusalem should “take a firmer stance against China’s support for Hamas and Iran-backed terrorism, exposing the hypocrisy and repression that underpin its vision for a new global order.”