The historian Jeffrey Herf, in Undeclared Wars with Israel, tells of East Germany’s vicious anti-Zionism, which went well beyond condemning Israel and expressing solidarity with those seeking its destruction: indeed, the German Democratic Republic provided funds and weapons to both Arab regimes and the PLO. For its part, Herf relates, the West German far left equated opposition to the government in Bonn with opposition to Israel, often crossing the line into anti-Semitism and, for the most committed, active participation in terrorist attacks against Jews. Allan Arkush writes in his review:

Unlike other Soviet-bloc nations, East Germany didn’t break relations with Israel after the Six-Day War—because it never had them in the first place. This was mostly due to its refusal to pay reparations for the crimes of the Nazis. But it did denounce Israel as the aggressor and likened it to the Nazi regime. . . . In the ensuing years, East Germany’s sales of armaments to the Arab world . . . ran in to the hundreds of millions of dollars. . . .

The West German far left, [meanwhile], emerged in a society that believed its own legitimacy to be bound up with a Vergangenheitsbewältigung (coming to terms with the past) that entailed not only repudiation of the Nazis but reparations to their Jewish victims. While East Germany was denying any responsibility for the Nazi regime and excoriating Israel, West Germany was transferring massive amount of money to it and offering the country its broad support. . . .

As the New Left turned against Israel after 1967, West German leftists followed suit and, in Herf’s words, “redefined the meaning of Vergangenheitsbewältigung” to justify the equation of the Jewish state’s alleged crimes with those of the Nazis. Leftists in the Federal Republic began speaking of the malign effects of Germany’s “Jewish complex” and condemning philo-Semitism. Arkush concludes:

Herf has produced not only a prodigiously researched indictment but also a timely reminder. . . . Undeclared Wars with Israel is . . . a post-mortem with a polemical edge, a book that very carefully digs up half-forgotten enemies of Israel from the recent past, in part to remind us that they have heirs who still repeat the same arguments, slogans, and calumnies. It is, unfortunately, doubtful that Herf’s tale of two hatreds would shame them, even if they were to read it.

Like his predecessor, Donald Trump seeks to expand the Abraham Accords to include Saudi Arabia. But there are other Arab nations that might consider taking such a step. Ahmad Charai points to Kuwait—home to the Middle East’s largest U.S. army base and desperately in need of economic reform—as a good candidate. Kuwaitis haven’t forgiven Palestinians for supporting Saddam Hussein during his 1990 invasion, but their country has been more rhetorically hostile to Israel than its Gulf neighbors:

The Abraham Accords have reshaped Middle Eastern diplomacy. . . . Kuwait, however, remains hesitant due to internal political resistance. While full normalization may not be immediately feasible, the United States should encourage Kuwait to take gradual steps toward engagement, emphasizing how participation in regional cooperation does not equate to abandoning its historical positions.

Kuwait could use its influence to push for peace in the Middle East through diplomatic channels opened by engagement rather than isolation. The economic benefits of joining the broader framework of the Abraham Accords are overwhelming. Israel’s leadership in technology, agriculture, and water management presents valuable opportunities for Kuwait to enhance its infrastructure. Trade and investment flows would diversify the economy, providing new markets and business partnerships.

Kuwaiti youth, who are increasingly looking for opportunities beyond the public sector, could benefit from collaboration with advanced industries, fostering job creation and entrepreneurial growth. The UAE and Bahrain have already demonstrated how normalization with Israel can drive economic expansion while maintaining their respective geopolitical identities.