As a narrow country with much of its population concentrated along its Mediterranean coast, Israel is particularly vulnerable to attack from the sea, and organizations like Hizballah and Hamas are able to do it substantial damage. Even more vulnerable are its natural-gas facilities, which Jerusalem hopes to expand. Turkey, meanwhile, has become a hostile power with influence in the eastern Mediterranean, while Iran and China are increasing their naval presences in the area. Seth Cropsey outlines a maritime strategy for Israel, which, he argues, will also benefit the U.S.:

[W]hile making sure that the Israeli navy’s size, composition, and balance are sufficient, a clear statement of maritime strategy would [further] improve Israel’s security. The objective is security for the close-in waters of [an] arc that stretches from Haifa through the western reaches of the Sinai to Eilat and the Red Sea. This would defend population centers, infrastructure including natural-gas rigs, and other coastal targets. It would be Israel’s first line of maritime defense. . . ,

A strategy of deterrence by denial—that is the ability to inflict immediate and substantial pain against attacking vessels or mine-layers, and the ports from which they and special operations forces emerge—is needed to stop attacks and even better, deter them. . . .

An Israeli maritime strategy should [also] consider how best to draw on Israel’s human and technological strengths for superior weapons, platforms, and sensors. . . . In the early 19th century, French naval planners developed what would become known as the jeune école concept of naval warfare. Based on smaller naval combatants and highly skilled crews, the intent was to deploy large numbers of technologically advanced, steam-propelled small vessels to counter England’s high-displacement battleships. . . . Israel has very high-quality and skilled sailors. Like 19th-century France, it possesses advanced technological skills. Marrying these two strengths is as useful in defeating terrorists at sea as it applies to defending against conventional ships. . . .

The U.S. has a major stake in the success of Israel’s sea defense, not only because of its interest in Israel’s overall security and well-being but because it has reduced its own presence in the Mediterranean so dramatically since the end of the cold war.

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.