While the U.S. has withdrawn from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—as the nuclear agreement with Tehran is formally known—the Islamic Republic’s response still remains unclear. Michael Herzog believes it unlikely that the ayatollahs will be content either to do nothing or to renegotiate the terms of the deal. He writes:

The more likely scenario is that Iran will resume its nuclear activities with regard to [uranium] enrichment, albeit slowly and gradually, at each phase [observing] the international and domestic response [before] deciding how to proceed. There is a range of activities they can undertake, starting with the . . . less risky part of the spectrum, and then possibly escalating. The more extreme measures of withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, stopping all cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), kicking out inspectors, and going underground with its nuclear program are less likely in the foreseeable future because they enhance the risk of a U.S. or Israeli military response and they will bring about loss of European support.

More likely is that Iran decides to enrich uranium up to 20 percent using new types of centrifuges and continues to work with the IAEA on its own terms—allowing limited inspections of declared sites. As major sanctions are kicking in regardless, the Iranians don’t have much to lose economically, but their continued cooperation with the IAEA may make it harder [for Israel or the U.S.] to decide on military action against them.

Once Iran resumes its nuclear program outside the scope of the JCPOA, both the U.S. and Israel will have to redefine their red lines concerning the Iranian nuclear program, namely where to draw a line, the crossing of which would trigger a military response against Iran. . . .

[O]ne also has to follow carefully the unfolding diplomatic process between the U.S. and North Korea. Everyone, including the Iranians, is watching very closely, and the situation in the Middle East will be [affected] by what develops in the Korean peninsula. If there is a real agreement on the denuclearization of North Korea, including credible inspections inside the country, then this will strengthen the U.S.’s hand vis-à-vis Iran. If, on the other hand, a weak deal with North Korea emerges that leaves its [nuclear] infrastructure and capabilities in place, this may strengthen the Iranians vis-à-vis the international community.

On Tuesday, representatives of Hamas met with their counterparts from Fatah—the faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) once led by Yasir Arafat that now governs parts of the West Bank—in Beijing to discuss possible reconciliation. While it is unlikely that these talks will yield any more progress than the many previous rounds, they constitute a significant step in China’s increasing attempts to involve itself in the Middle East on the side of Israel’s enemies.

By contrast, writes Tuvia Gering, Taiwan has been quick and consistent in its condemnations of Hamas and Iran and its expressions of sympathy with Israel:

Support from Taipei goes beyond words. Taiwan’s appointee in Tel Aviv and de-facto ambassador, Abby Lee, has been busy aiding hostage families, adopting the most affected kibbutzim in southern Israel, and volunteering with farmers. Taiwan recently pledged more than half a million dollars to Israel for critical initiatives, including medical and communications supplies for local municipalities. This follows earlier aid from Taiwan to an organization helping Israeli soldiers and families immediately after the October 7 attack.

The reasons why are not hard to fathom:

In many ways, Taiwan sees a reflection of itself in Israel—two vibrant democracies facing threats from hostile neighbors. Both nations wield substantial economic and technological prowess, and both heavily depend on U.S. military exports and diplomacy. Taipei also sees Israel as a “role model” for what Taiwan should aspire to be, citing its unwavering determination and capabilities to defend itself.

On a deeper level, Taiwanese leaders seem to view Israel’s war with Hamas and Iran as an extension of a greater struggle between democracy and autocracy.

Gering urges Israel to reciprocate these expressions of friendship and to take into account that “China has been going above and beyond to demonize the Jewish state in international forums.” Above all, he writes, Jerusalem should “take a firmer stance against China’s support for Hamas and Iran-backed terrorism, exposing the hypocrisy and repression that underpin its vision for a new global order.”