Last week, Israel and Hamas seem to have arrived at a cease-fire, although its terms have not yet been made public. Gazans nevertheless resumed violent rioting at the border fence on Friday—complete with Molotov cocktails and incendiary balloons—and an IDF patrol came under fire yesterday. Although Jerusalem has not been entirely clear about its overall strategy for dealing with Hamas, and some have claimed it has none, Yossi Kuperwasser argues that the government’s approach is made clear by its actions:

For lack of any other feasible alternative, Israel is ready to accept Hamas as the de-facto ruling party in the Gaza Strip. It is not easy to legitimize this de-facto reality, since Hamas is a terror entity committed to Israel’s annihilation, but Israel believes that Hamas and the terrorism that comes with it can be constrained and contained for long periods of time. . . .

When it comes to military options, Israel wants to keep Hamas worried about the possibility of a ground offensive that will deprive it of its crown jewel, namely its control of Gaza. But at the same time, the Israeli government clearly has no appetite for such an operation, because it wants to avoid the casualties and to refrain from retaking Gaza. Israel repeatedly exacts a price for Hamas attacks through targeted air strikes and depriving Hamas of the ability to use terror options (rockets, naval operations, tunnels, balloons, and kites). This Israel is able to do without resorting to a ground offensive. Since the 2005 disengagement, Israel has not been—and does not regard itself as—an occupying force in Gaza, whereas the Palestinians and many other international players do not accept Israel’s outlook, and Egypt refuses to assume responsibility over this territory. . . .

[In other words], Israel does have a short- to medium-term strategy for Gaza, which like most other strategies contains inherent contradictions, especially given the complexity of the situation. In the last round of escalation, [this strategy] was proved effective once again, although employing harsher steps against the arson kites’ operators and their commanders and restricting the activity at the Kerem Shalom crossing [between Israel and Gaza] earlier on could have shortened this round and forced Hamas to stop the violence more quickly.

However, the ongoing instability and provocation from Palestinian forces in Gaza challenges Israel’s ability to sustain this strategy. Gaza’s rulers are not willing, for example, to give up their force build-up or to stop using human shields, and they continue to keep corpses of Israeli soldiers in their possession. Their strategy rests on creating disorder and militates against stability and prosperity—and thus makes sustaining the Israeli strategy challenging.

For some time, opponents of U.S support for Israel have been urging the White House to end the war in Gaza, or simply calling for a ceasefire. Douglas Feith and Lewis Libby consider what such a result would actually entail:

Ending the war immediately would allow Hamas to survive and retain military and governing power. Leaving it in the area containing the Sinai-Gaza smuggling routes would ensure that Hamas can rearm. This is why Hamas leaders now plead for a ceasefire. A ceasefire will provide some relief for Gazans today, but a prolonged ceasefire will preserve Hamas’s bloody oppression of Gaza and make future wars with Israel inevitable.

For most Gazans, even when there is no hot war, Hamas’s dictatorship is a nightmarish tyranny. Hamas rule features the torture and murder of regime opponents, official corruption, extremist indoctrination of children, and misery for the population in general. Hamas diverts foreign aid and other resources from proper uses; instead of improving life for the mass of the people, it uses the funds to fight against Palestinians and Israelis.

Moreover, a Hamas-affiliated website warned Gazans last month against cooperating with Israel in securing and delivering the truckloads of aid flowing into the Strip. It promised to deal with those who do with “an iron fist.” In other words, if Hamas remains in power, it will begin torturing, imprisoning, or murdering those it deems collaborators the moment the war ends. Thereafter, Hamas will begin planning its next attack on Israel:

Hamas’s goals are to overshadow the Palestinian Authority, win control of the West Bank, and establish Hamas leadership over the Palestinian revolution. Hamas’s ultimate aim is to spark a regional war to obliterate Israel and, as Hamas leaders steadfastly maintain, fulfill a Quranic vision of killing all Jews.

Hamas planned for corpses of Palestinian babies and mothers to serve as the mainspring of its October 7 war plan. Hamas calculated it could survive a war against a superior Israeli force and energize enemies of Israel around the world. The key to both aims was arranging for grievous Palestinian civilian losses. . . . That element of Hamas’s war plan is working impressively.