After Hamas launched hundreds of rockets into Israel, the IDF responded by destroying a few buildings in the Gaza Strip, including the one that housed the Hamas television station, and then agreed to a cease-fire. Ron Ben-Yishai argues that Jerusalem was too quick to do so:

The Israeli acceptance of a cease-fire the minute Hamas offered it erodes what is left of Israel’s deterrence, opening the door for further and more severe rounds of fighting in the not-too-distant future. . . . Moreover, both the truce efforts and the surprise rocket attack launched against Israel on Monday were Hamas’s doing. Israel barely responded, serving as the pawn of an organization that is waging a war of attrition against the residents of its southern region. . . .

One should be skeptical about the chances of the current cease-fire agreement leading to long-term quiet [for] two reasons: firstly, the arrogance demonstrated by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, who have been repeatedly declaring over the past 24 hours that they “taught Israel a lesson.” Moreover, . . . it’s doubtful [Hamas is] suffering much from the damage Israel inflicted on its military assets. [From the terrorist group’s perspective], that’s a reasonable price to pay for the psychological blow inflicted on Israel. . . .

Showing restraint meant something so long as Hamas was not stepping over the line while provoking Israel, and so long as Israeli deterrence was maintained vis-à-vis Gaza’s terror organizations. This week’s events have created a strategic turning point for Hamas, [that will dangerously embolden its leaders]. The Israeli leadership failed to notice this turning point, [and it’s likely] the Gaza border communities’ residents will pay the highest price.

Robert Satloff has some harsh words for the U.S. government in this regard, words I take especially seriously because Satloff is someone inclined to political moderation. Why, he asks, have American diplomats failed to achieve anything in their endless rounds of talks in Doha and Cairo? Because

there is simply not enough pressure on Hamas to change course, accept a deal, and release the remaining October 7 hostages, stuck in nightmarish captivity. . . . In this environment, why should Hamas change course?

Publicly, the U.S. should bite the bullet and urge Israel to complete the main battle operations in Gaza—i.e., the Rafah operation—as swiftly and efficiently as possible. We should be assertively assisting with the humanitarian side of this.

Satloff had more to say about the hostages, especially the five American ones, in a speech he gave recently:

I am ashamed—ashamed of how we have allowed the story of the hostages to get lost in the noise of the war that followed their capture; ashamed of how we have permitted their release to be a bargaining chip in some larger political negotiation; ashamed of how we have failed to give them the respect and dignity and our wholehearted demand for Red Cross access and care and medicine that is our normal, usual demand for hostages.

If they were taken by Boko Haram, everyone would know their name. If they were taken by the Taliban, everyone would tie a yellow ribbon around a tree for them. If they were taken by Islamic State, kids would learn about them in school.

It is repugnant to see their freedom as just one item on the bargaining table with Hamas, as though they were chattel. These are Americans—and they deserve to be backed by the full faith and credit of the United States.