In a political climate where Israel’s left is relatively weak and the Likud’s major electoral competitor is the centrist Blue-and-White party, Benjamin Netanyahu found himself unable to form a government because he could not get one of the smaller right-wing parties to join his coalition—forcing a second round of elections in September. Such factional squabbles, argues Akiva Bigman, led to the defeat of the right in 1988, when hard-right splinter parties (none of which endured) broke from Yitzḥak Shamir’s Likud after he decided to form a national-unity government with Labor:

[In 1988], Shamir was at the head of the unity government, and Shimon Peres and Yitzḥak Rabin, both of the Labor party, were to serve in the roles of foreign minister and defense minister, respectively. In a speech [to the Knesset], Shamir spoke of his hope for peace with the Arab states and presented Jordan as a solution to the Palestinian problem. Settlements in Judea and Samaria were to remain and be expanded, the status of Jerusalem was not up for discussion, and negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) were out of the question, he said. . . .

The alternative to Shamir’s vision was not just theoretical in nature. Representatives on the left had stated their explicit commitment to entering peace talks with the PLO. Shamir succeeded in enlisting Labor in a government that ruled out such negotiations, in an effort to present a broad and unified front to contend with international pressure on the subject. But this did not interest the ideological hawks in the Knesset.

Yuval Ne’eman of the now-defunct ultra-nationalist T’ḥiyah party . . . accused Likud of being a left-wing party in disguise. . . . Rafael Eitan of the now-defunct Tzomet party . . . accused the government of being ineffective because a series of reforms weren’t moving as fast as he would have liked. . . . Last among these ideologues was the late Reḥavam Ze’evi, founder of the Moledet party, [since then absorbed entirely by Jewish Home], who said the government was incapable of contending with Israel’s national-security issues. . . .

The result: these smaller parties joined the opposition, Labor won the 1992 elections, and the Oslo Accords, with their disastrous results, followed.

Between December 27 and January 6, terrorists in Gaza fired rockets at Israel almost every night. On Monday, one rocket struck a home in the much-bombarded town of Sderot, although no one was injured. The rocket fire had largely halted last spring, and for some time barrages were often the result of Israeli forces closing in a Hamas unit or munitions depot. But the truth—which gives credence to Ran Baratz’s argument in his January essay that the IDF is struggling to accomplish its mission—is that Hamas has been able to rebuild. Yoni Ben Menachem writes that the jihadist group has been “producing hundreds of new rockets using lathes smuggled into tunnels that remain operational in Gaza.” Moreover, it has been replenishing its ranks:

According to Israeli security officials, Hamas has recruited approximately 4,000 new fighters over the past month. This rapid expansion bolsters its fighting capabilities and complicates Israel’s efforts to apply military pressure on Hamas to expedite a hostage deal. Hamas’s military recovery has allowed it to prolong its war of attrition against the IDF and adopt tougher stances in hostage negotiations. The funds for this recruitment effort are reportedly from the sale of humanitarian-aid packages, which Hamas forcibly seizes and resells in Gaza’s markets.

In fact, Ben Menachem writes, Hamas’s rocket fire is part of the same strategy:

By firing rockets, Hamas seeks to demonstrate its resilience and operational capability despite the IDF’s prolonged offensive. This message is aimed at both Gaza’s residents and the Israeli public, underscoring that Hamas remains a significant force even after enduring heavy losses [and] that Israel cannot easily occupy this region, currently a focal point of IDF operations.