The 2018 Israeli municipal elections brought to the fore political divisions among the country’s Ḥaredim. Most significantly, the major Ashkenazi religious parties—the ḥasidic Agudat Yisrael and the non-ḥasidic (or “Lithuanian”) Degel ha-Torah—ran separate candidates in many local races for the first time since their merger in 1992. Moreover, smaller ḥaredi splinter parties, both Sephardi and Ashkenazi, entered the fray, and tensions have increased between followers of Jerusalem rabbis and of those who live in the Tel Aviv suburb of Bnei Brak. While some observers have predicted the imminent collapse of the ultra-Orthodox parties, Meir Hirschmann sees long-term stability:

[F]ollowing the first national election of 2019, . . . it seems that in the national arena ḥaredi politics have proved themselves to be a model of cohesion and stability. No party sailed through the elections as calmly as the ḥaredi parties. Not only were there no splits, there was even talk of a united ḥaredi front. No revolution, no collapse, and no crisis.

[S]plits at the municipal level in the recent elections had virtually no negative consequences for the national elections. [If anything, these] shocks at the local level assured that the national election would proceed calmly and smoothly, with each community recognizing the limits of its power.

A centralized, uniform, and homogenous ḥaredi leadership, [however], exists only as a nostalgic mirage, based on a very brief period in the history of ḥaredi politics. In practice, ḥaredi politics in Israel, at both the national and local level, have been characterized by a dynamic more reminiscent of the latest municipal elections. The splits, sub-splits, and local alliances are no exception in ḥaredi politics; they are indeed the rule.

For some time, opponents of U.S support for Israel have been urging the White House to end the war in Gaza, or simply calling for a ceasefire. Douglas Feith and Lewis Libby consider what such a result would actually entail:

Ending the war immediately would allow Hamas to survive and retain military and governing power. Leaving it in the area containing the Sinai-Gaza smuggling routes would ensure that Hamas can rearm. This is why Hamas leaders now plead for a ceasefire. A ceasefire will provide some relief for Gazans today, but a prolonged ceasefire will preserve Hamas’s bloody oppression of Gaza and make future wars with Israel inevitable.

For most Gazans, even when there is no hot war, Hamas’s dictatorship is a nightmarish tyranny. Hamas rule features the torture and murder of regime opponents, official corruption, extremist indoctrination of children, and misery for the population in general. Hamas diverts foreign aid and other resources from proper uses; instead of improving life for the mass of the people, it uses the funds to fight against Palestinians and Israelis.

Moreover, a Hamas-affiliated website warned Gazans last month against cooperating with Israel in securing and delivering the truckloads of aid flowing into the Strip. It promised to deal with those who do with “an iron fist.” In other words, if Hamas remains in power, it will begin torturing, imprisoning, or murdering those it deems collaborators the moment the war ends. Thereafter, Hamas will begin planning its next attack on Israel:

Hamas’s goals are to overshadow the Palestinian Authority, win control of the West Bank, and establish Hamas leadership over the Palestinian revolution. Hamas’s ultimate aim is to spark a regional war to obliterate Israel and, as Hamas leaders steadfastly maintain, fulfill a Quranic vision of killing all Jews.

Hamas planned for corpses of Palestinian babies and mothers to serve as the mainspring of its October 7 war plan. Hamas calculated it could survive a war against a superior Israeli force and energize enemies of Israel around the world. The key to both aims was arranging for grievous Palestinian civilian losses. . . . That element of Hamas’s war plan is working impressively.