In October, shortly before stepping down, Secretary of Energy Rick Perry announced that talks over providing Riyadh with American assistance in developing its civilian nuclear capabilities had reached an impasse over Saudi reluctance to pledge not to enrich uranium. Once a country can enrich uranium itself, it can produce not only the low-enriched fuel used for civilian purposes but also the high-enriched form necessary for nuclear weapons. For decades, the American-led nonproliferation regime has allowed nations to purchase the former while forbidding them to enrich it themselves. But the Obama administration’s recognition of an Iranian “right to enrich” has overturned that standard. Yoel Guzansky notes the consequences:
The Saudi Nuclear Program Poses a Danger to Israel
How the Recent Sabotage of an Iranian Nuclear Facility Relates to Negotiations with the U.S.
According to recent reports, American nuclear negotiators in Vienna have expressed willingness to roll back significantly sanctions on the Islamic Republic. Meanwhile, a major power outage at the Iranian nuclear facility in Natanz—thought to have been caused by Israeli sabotage—has set back Tehran’s progress in producing the fuel necessary for an atomic bomb. Eran Lerman examines the relationship between these developments: