In October, shortly before stepping down, Secretary of Energy Rick Perry announced that talks over providing Riyadh with American assistance in developing its civilian nuclear capabilities had reached an impasse over Saudi reluctance to pledge not to enrich uranium. Once a country can enrich uranium itself, it can produce not only the low-enriched fuel used for civilian purposes but also the high-enriched form necessary for nuclear weapons. For decades, the American-led nonproliferation regime has allowed nations to purchase the former while forbidding them to enrich it themselves. But the Obama administration’s recognition of an Iranian “right to enrich” has overturned that standard. Yoel Guzansky notes the consequences:

Since Joe Biden’s election to the presidency, supporters of the 2015 nuclear deal with Tehran—formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—have been advocating for the new administration to rejoin the agreement. Doing so would be a strategic mistake, argue Michael Oren and Yossi Klein Halevi: