In October, shortly before stepping down, Secretary of Energy Rick Perry announced that talks over providing Riyadh with American assistance in developing its civilian nuclear capabilities had reached an impasse over Saudi reluctance to pledge not to enrich uranium. Once a country can enrich uranium itself, it can produce not only the low-enriched fuel used for civilian purposes but also the high-enriched form necessary for nuclear weapons. For decades, the American-led nonproliferation regime has allowed nations to purchase the former while forbidding them to enrich it themselves. But the Obama administration’s recognition of an Iranian “right to enrich” has overturned that standard. Yoel Guzansky notes the consequences:

Under the current circumstances, it seems unlikely, writes Dennis Ross, that Washington will succeed in negotiating a return to the 2015 nuclear agreement with Tehran—and even if it does, it is even more unlikely that the Biden administration will be able to make good on its promise to negotiate a “longer and stronger” version of the deal. Ross thus suggests a simple way to make clear to the Islamic Republic the risks of continuing to pursue a nuclear weapon: