Within a few months of Yasir Arafat’s death in 2004, he was succeeded by Mahmoud Abbas as the head of two interlocking institutions: the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Authority (PA). Abbas further consolidated his power in 2009 by taking over a third position formerly held by Arafat: that of chairman of Fatah, the dominant party in the PLO. Unlike his predecessor, Abbas has “systematically undermined the emergence of strong political figures that could be potential successors,” explains Ghaith al-Omari. Abbas, elected to the PA presidency for a four-year term fifteen years ago, is now eighty-four-year-old, has suffered from health problems, and does not appear to have any plans to retire. Omari continues:

Part of what enabled a smooth succession after Arafat’s death was the relative strength of key Palestinian political institutions, particularly Fatah and the PLO. Today, these institutions are undergoing serious crises, which will limit their ability to play a stabilizing role during the coming succession.

Fatah, the PA leadership, and the PLO may have an interest in a swift, orderly succession akin to Abbas’s own ascendance following Arafat’s death, this is far from certain. In his efforts to eliminate dissent, Abbas has prevented the emergence of strong political figures who could become obvious successors. [Likewise], the United States has an interest in an orderly transfer of power but holds few tools to effect this outcome. . . . Ultimately, however, the conduct and outcome of the succession contest will depend on internal Palestinian decisions.

Meanwhile, Ehud Yaari adds, there is a growing competition among several vaguely defined factions to place themselves in a position to determine Abba’s successor:

[There have been] strenuous efforts by some contenders to obtain the allegiance of armed groups from the myriad squads of the Tanzim—the organization of [armed] Fatah cadres—in West Bank refugee camps, the countryside, and the poorer suburbs. Numerous cases of violent friction between Tanzim groups allied with rival politicians have been contained at an early stage. Around Nablus, however, fatalities have occurred in clashes between PA security forces and local gangs.

It is worth noting that the PA has never embarked on a systematic campaign to disarm these groups, which sprang up as a result of Arafat’s secret move to distribute weapons to Tanzim activists in 1997. The Tanzim groups possess an abundance of guns, and the security forces are usually reluctant to confront those possessing them. It is [also] important to stress that the competition reflects personal and factional interests more than significant political differences.

In short, conclude both Yaari and Omari, the power vacuum resulting from Abbas’s death could lead to instability or chaos, and perhaps a resumption of terror.

For some time, opponents of U.S support for Israel have been urging the White House to end the war in Gaza, or simply calling for a ceasefire. Douglas Feith and Lewis Libby consider what such a result would actually entail:

Ending the war immediately would allow Hamas to survive and retain military and governing power. Leaving it in the area containing the Sinai-Gaza smuggling routes would ensure that Hamas can rearm. This is why Hamas leaders now plead for a ceasefire. A ceasefire will provide some relief for Gazans today, but a prolonged ceasefire will preserve Hamas’s bloody oppression of Gaza and make future wars with Israel inevitable.

For most Gazans, even when there is no hot war, Hamas’s dictatorship is a nightmarish tyranny. Hamas rule features the torture and murder of regime opponents, official corruption, extremist indoctrination of children, and misery for the population in general. Hamas diverts foreign aid and other resources from proper uses; instead of improving life for the mass of the people, it uses the funds to fight against Palestinians and Israelis.

Moreover, a Hamas-affiliated website warned Gazans last month against cooperating with Israel in securing and delivering the truckloads of aid flowing into the Strip. It promised to deal with those who do with “an iron fist.” In other words, if Hamas remains in power, it will begin torturing, imprisoning, or murdering those it deems collaborators the moment the war ends. Thereafter, Hamas will begin planning its next attack on Israel:

Hamas’s goals are to overshadow the Palestinian Authority, win control of the West Bank, and establish Hamas leadership over the Palestinian revolution. Hamas’s ultimate aim is to spark a regional war to obliterate Israel and, as Hamas leaders steadfastly maintain, fulfill a Quranic vision of killing all Jews.

Hamas planned for corpses of Palestinian babies and mothers to serve as the mainspring of its October 7 war plan. Hamas calculated it could survive a war against a superior Israeli force and energize enemies of Israel around the world. The key to both aims was arranging for grievous Palestinian civilian losses. . . . That element of Hamas’s war plan is working impressively.