Given its global reach, the American military divides the world into various “areas of responsibility” each with its own unified command structure. Operations in Africa are thus supervised by the Africa Command (AFCOM), while troops stationed in Europe answer to EUCOM, and so forth. But due to the longstanding Arab hostility toward Israel, it was placed under EUCOM’s area of responsibility while the rest of the Middle East belongs to that of Central Command (CENTCOM). Michael Makovsky and Charles Wald argue that there is no need to maintain this irrational division of labor:

For years, Israel has been working closely with Egypt’s and Jordan’s military and intelligence services against Islamic State, Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, and other common threats. That cooperation accelerated and expanded to other Arab countries as America retreated from the region—tilting toward Iran under President Obama—and Iranian and Turkish aggression filled the ensuing vacuum. The Abraham Accords marks a natural progression for this convergence of interests and rising cooperation.

Moving Israel to CENTCOM’s area of responsibility would enhance U.S.-Israel as well as Israel-Arab coordination on military operations, strategic planning, and early warning and critical-infrastructure protection—including against Iranian nuclear, conventional and terrorism threats. It would also enable the United States and Israel to extend their impressive operational and technical achievements on missile defense to the rest of the Middle East—paramount consideration amid regionwide missile proliferation by Iran and Hizballah. Further, it would enable more direct American and Arab learning from Israel’s hard-won lessons in its ongoing campaign against Iran.

It is true that several U.S. partners in CENTCOM still don’t recognize Israel. However, that was also the case for decades with EUCOM, which formerly included the Middle East and Africa. We understand some of these countries don’t oppose Israel’s inclusion, marking further progress in Israel’s ongoing diplomatic breakthroughs with Arab neighbors.

Before exploding electronics in Lebanon seized the attention of the Israeli public, debate there had focused on the Philadelphi Corridor—the strip of land between Gaza and Egypt—and whether the IDF can afford to withdraw from it. Egypt has opposed Israeli control of the corridor, which is crucial to Hamas’s supply lines, and Egyptian objections likely prevented Israel from seizing it earlier in the war. Yet, argues Mariam Wahba, Egypt in the long run only stands to lose by letting Hamas use the corridor, and has proved incapable of effectively sealing it off:

Ultimately, this moment presents an opportunity for the United States to hold Egypt’s feet to the fire.

To press Cairo, the United States should consider conditioning future aid on Cairo’s willingness to cooperate. This should include a demand for greater transparency and independent oversight to verify Egyptian claims about the tunnels. Congress ought to hold hearings to understand better Egypt’s role and its compliance as a U.S. ally. Despite Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s nine trips to the Middle East since the start of the war, there has been little clarity on how Egypt intends to fulfill its role as a mediator.

By refusing to acknowledge Israel’s legitimate security concerns, Egypt is undermining its own interests, prolonging the war in Gaza, and further destabilizing its relationship with Jerusalem. It is time for Egyptian leaders either to admit their inability to secure the border and seek help from Israel and America, or to risk being perceived as enablers of Hamas and its terrorist campaign.