Yesterday, the Palestinian Authority (PA) president Mahmoud Abbas announced that he will postpone indefinitely the parliamentary elections that had been scheduled for May 22. Writing on the eve of the decision, Ghaith al-Omari explains that the elections would have likely created a highly volatile situation. But their cancellation brings dangers of its own. He begins with the situation on the West Bank, where Abbas’s Fatah party rules, but Hamas nonetheless has a presence:

Hamas, whose terror infrastructure [in the West Bank] is severely degraded, will . . . likely seek to escalate. Fatah factions that will once again feel marginalized by Abbas may also resort to protests. Whether developments in the West Bank will mobilize the public and turn into mass confrontations is unknowable. If that happens, it is also impossible to predict whether such protests will start against Israel or the PA (though if protests do occur, they will likely end up targeting both). The ingredients for an explosive mix are there, but recent years have shown limited public appetite for a return to widespread unrest. Moreover, PA security forces—separately and in cooperation with Israeli security forces—have proved effective. But the bottom line is this: the days following the cancellation announcement will be extremely tense.

Politically, Hamas will emerge as the winner in the short term. Having vocally rejected cancellation of the elections, the group is well-positioned to claim that it represents the will of both the 76 percent of Palestinians who demand elections and the 61 percent who expect them to be held. Yet after an initial spike in popularity, Hamas will find itself where it started: regionally isolated, partially blamed for the Palestinian split, and at the strategic dead end of controlling Gaza without a clear path to improving the conditions there significantly.

At the national level, a failure to hold elections highlights the difficulty—even impossibility—of achieving intra-Palestinian reconciliation. Various approaches—including attempts to reach comprehensive reconciliation, attempts at limited reconciliation via the formation of a unity government, and now elections—have failed. Although the failure of each approach can be explained by its specific circumstances, it is hard to escape the conclusion that national unity is not a likely option in the foreseeable future.

For some time, opponents of U.S support for Israel have been urging the White House to end the war in Gaza, or simply calling for a ceasefire. Douglas Feith and Lewis Libby consider what such a result would actually entail:

Ending the war immediately would allow Hamas to survive and retain military and governing power. Leaving it in the area containing the Sinai-Gaza smuggling routes would ensure that Hamas can rearm. This is why Hamas leaders now plead for a ceasefire. A ceasefire will provide some relief for Gazans today, but a prolonged ceasefire will preserve Hamas’s bloody oppression of Gaza and make future wars with Israel inevitable.

For most Gazans, even when there is no hot war, Hamas’s dictatorship is a nightmarish tyranny. Hamas rule features the torture and murder of regime opponents, official corruption, extremist indoctrination of children, and misery for the population in general. Hamas diverts foreign aid and other resources from proper uses; instead of improving life for the mass of the people, it uses the funds to fight against Palestinians and Israelis.

Moreover, a Hamas-affiliated website warned Gazans last month against cooperating with Israel in securing and delivering the truckloads of aid flowing into the Strip. It promised to deal with those who do with “an iron fist.” In other words, if Hamas remains in power, it will begin torturing, imprisoning, or murdering those it deems collaborators the moment the war ends. Thereafter, Hamas will begin planning its next attack on Israel:

Hamas’s goals are to overshadow the Palestinian Authority, win control of the West Bank, and establish Hamas leadership over the Palestinian revolution. Hamas’s ultimate aim is to spark a regional war to obliterate Israel and, as Hamas leaders steadfastly maintain, fulfill a Quranic vision of killing all Jews.

Hamas planned for corpses of Palestinian babies and mothers to serve as the mainspring of its October 7 war plan. Hamas calculated it could survive a war against a superior Israeli force and energize enemies of Israel around the world. The key to both aims was arranging for grievous Palestinian civilian losses. . . . That element of Hamas’s war plan is working impressively.