Israel’s new governing coalition is the first since 2013 not to include the ḥaredi parties—the leaders of which have been hurling invective at it since it was sworn in. In general, these parties have always tried to find their way into the government regardless of which party dominates, hoping to trade their valuable Knesset votes for support on issues of particular importance to their constituents. Haviv Rettig Gur explains:

Ḥaredi parties . . . have been part of nearly every coalition—left, right and center—since the 1970s. . . . Historically, [these] parties largely ignored questions of national security, regional strategy, land, or Palestinian independence. Their top priority was always ensuring state funding for their institutions and communities.

That’s no accident. The Israeli ḥaredi community is deeply dependent on state funding, with large families and high rates of nonparticipation in the workforce, especially among men who choose to study in yeshiva full time. . . . Roughly 1.3 billion shekels ($400 million) in state funding goes to their yeshivas each year and billions more to the vast slew of ḥaredi charities, school networks, and community institutions.

But looking behind the scenes and reading between the lines, Gur notes a shift away from this purely transactional model:

Ḥaredi society once rejected “secular” Israel out of hand. Slowly, in piecemeal increments, that’s flipped. Most now identify deeply with the state, and as that identification grows, the demand to have a say in shaping Israeli society grows with it. Studies now show that ordinary Ḥaredim feel a cultural affinity with traditionalist right-wing voters, [that is, those who are religious Zionists or merely somewhat religiously observant].

So it is that anyone who follows the overheated rhetoric of the ḥaredi MKs in recent days will notice that they have studiously avoided all talk of money and focused instead on the religious culture war.

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.