For several weeks, a recurring theme in Israeli headlines has been endemic crime and rising murder rates in Arab towns and neighborhoods in Israel. Prevalent crime leads to a growing sense of lawlessness, and is taking a human toll on the victims and their families. Although these victims are themselves overwhelmingly Arab, there are indications that the same lawlessness gave rise to the anti-Jewish riots that broke out in the spring. Martin Sherman writes:

The sense of despair and danger has generated an “#Arab Lives Matter” campaign—in an evident attempt to mimic the #BlackLivesMatter (BLM) movement in the United States. But . . . unlike the BLM initiative in the U.S., Israel’s Arab leaders are calling for increased—not decreased—police presence.

Despite the fact that Israel’s deputy police commissioner Jamal Hakrush is a Muslim Arab, Arab leaders have discouraged young Israeli Muslims from enlisting in the police—as Christian Arabs and Druze do. . . . Perversely, Arab lawmakers who bewail police inaction oppose setting up police stations in Arab towns. Thus, Ayman Odeh, head of the Joint Arab List, asserted: “More police stations are not necessary.” Another Joint List parliamentarian, Yousef Jabareen, declared, “We see the police as part of the oppression mechanism in Israel.”

Harkush is one of many Arabs who disagree with these parliamentarians. But what of the argument that the underlying causes of the crime wave are poverty and lack of resources? Sherman writes:

Firstly, there is an apparent overstatement of the level of poverty that prevails in Israel in general, and in the Arab sector in particular. [Moreover], despite accusations that they are subject to prejudice and suspicion from their Jewish counterparts, which diminish their chances for advancement and employment, Arab Israelis attend Israeli universities and other academic institutions in significant numbers, with a particularly steep rise in the last decade.

But concern over economic disparities has led successive Israeli governments to funnel money into Arab communities, with paradoxical results. Sherman cites an Arab lawyer who pointed out that, “municipality heads were always targeted by criminal organizations,” but following the legislation that has directed billions of dollars into the Arab sector in the past six years, “as more money has been spent on local authorities, the local authorities have become a larger prize.”

Nor is Sherman inclined toward such chauvinistic explanations as the suggestion that “Arab culture” is simply more violent. He concludes:

While it is true that the violent crime wave in Arab-Israeli society cannot be ignored and requires greater and more muscular intervention by state authorities, it is a problem that is unlikely to be adequately addressed without some profound soul-searching by Arab Israelis themselves, and greater identification with the state in which they live and with the institutions whose protection they seek. In the absence of such change, the current criminal surge could easily morph into interethnic conflict and civil war.

In a momentous meeting with the Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh, President Trump announced that he is lifting sanctions on the beleaguered and war-torn country. On the one hand, Sharaa is an alumnus of Islamic State and al-Qaeda, who came to power as commander of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which itself began life as al-Qaeda’s Syrian offshoot; he also seems to enjoy the support of Qatar. On the other hand, he overthrew the Assad regime—a feat made possible by the battering Israel delivered to Hizballah—greatly improving Jerusalem’s strategic position, and ending one of the world’s most atrocious and brutal tyrannies. President Trump also announced that he hopes Syria will join the Abraham Accords.

This analysis by Eran Lerman was published a few days ago, and in some respects is already out of date, but more than anything else I’ve read it helps to make sense of Israel’s strategic position vis-à-vis Syria.

Israel’s primary security interest lies in defending against worst-case scenarios, particularly the potential collapse of the Syrian state or its transformation into an actively hostile force backed by a significant Turkish presence (considering that the Turkish military is the second largest in NATO) with all that this would imply. Hence the need to bolster the new buffer zone—not for territorial gain, but as a vital shield and guarantee against dangerous developments. Continued airstrikes aimed at diminishing the residual components of strategic military capabilities inherited from the Assad regime are essential.

At the same time, there is a need to create conditions that would enable those in Damascus who wish to reject the reduction of their once-proud country into a Turkish satrapy. Sharaa’s efforts to establish his legitimacy, including his visit to Paris and outreach to the U.S., other European nations, and key Gulf countries, may generate positive leverage in this regard. Israel’s role is to demonstrate through daily actions the severe costs of acceding to Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ambitions and accepting Turkish hegemony.

Israel should also assist those in Syria (and beyond: this may have an effect in Lebanon as well) who look to it as a strategic anchor in the region. The Druze in Syria—backed by their brethren in Israel—have openly expressed this expectation, breaking decades of loyalty to the central power in Damascus over their obligation to their kith and kin.