For several weeks, a recurring theme in Israeli headlines has been endemic crime and rising murder rates in Arab towns and neighborhoods in Israel. Prevalent crime leads to a growing sense of lawlessness, and is taking a human toll on the victims and their families. Although these victims are themselves overwhelmingly Arab, there are indications that the same lawlessness gave rise to the anti-Jewish riots that broke out in the spring. Martin Sherman writes:

The sense of despair and danger has generated an “#Arab Lives Matter” campaign—in an evident attempt to mimic the #BlackLivesMatter (BLM) movement in the United States. But . . . unlike the BLM initiative in the U.S., Israel’s Arab leaders are calling for increased—not decreased—police presence.

Despite the fact that Israel’s deputy police commissioner Jamal Hakrush is a Muslim Arab, Arab leaders have discouraged young Israeli Muslims from enlisting in the police—as Christian Arabs and Druze do. . . . Perversely, Arab lawmakers who bewail police inaction oppose setting up police stations in Arab towns. Thus, Ayman Odeh, head of the Joint Arab List, asserted: “More police stations are not necessary.” Another Joint List parliamentarian, Yousef Jabareen, declared, “We see the police as part of the oppression mechanism in Israel.”

Harkush is one of many Arabs who disagree with these parliamentarians. But what of the argument that the underlying causes of the crime wave are poverty and lack of resources? Sherman writes:

Firstly, there is an apparent overstatement of the level of poverty that prevails in Israel in general, and in the Arab sector in particular. [Moreover], despite accusations that they are subject to prejudice and suspicion from their Jewish counterparts, which diminish their chances for advancement and employment, Arab Israelis attend Israeli universities and other academic institutions in significant numbers, with a particularly steep rise in the last decade.

But concern over economic disparities has led successive Israeli governments to funnel money into Arab communities, with paradoxical results. Sherman cites an Arab lawyer who pointed out that, “municipality heads were always targeted by criminal organizations,” but following the legislation that has directed billions of dollars into the Arab sector in the past six years, “as more money has been spent on local authorities, the local authorities have become a larger prize.”

Nor is Sherman inclined toward such chauvinistic explanations as the suggestion that “Arab culture” is simply more violent. He concludes:

While it is true that the violent crime wave in Arab-Israeli society cannot be ignored and requires greater and more muscular intervention by state authorities, it is a problem that is unlikely to be adequately addressed without some profound soul-searching by Arab Israelis themselves, and greater identification with the state in which they live and with the institutions whose protection they seek. In the absence of such change, the current criminal surge could easily morph into interethnic conflict and civil war.

This week, there have been numerous unconfirmed reports about the fate of Esmail Qaani, who is the head of the Quds Force, the expeditionary arm of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. Benny Avni writes:

On Thursday, Sky News Arabic reported that Mr. Qaani was rushed to a hospital after suffering a heart attack. He became [the Quds Force] commander in 2020, after an American drone strike killed his predecessor, Qassem Suleimani. The unit oversees the Islamic Republic’s various Mideast proxies, as well as the exporting of the Iranian revolution to the region and beyond.

The Sky News report attempts to put to rest earlier claims that Mr. Qaani was killed at Beirut. It follows several reports asserting he has been arrested and interrogated at Tehran over suspicion that he, or a top lieutenant, leaked information to Israel. Five days ago, the Arabic-language al-Arabiya network reported that Mr. Qaani “is under surveillance and isolation, following the Israeli assassinations of prominent Iranian leaders.”

Iranians are desperately scrambling to plug possible leaks that gave Israel precise intelligence to conduct pinpoint strikes against Hizballah commanders. . . . “I find it hard to believe that Qaani was compromised,” an Iran watcher at Tel Aviv University’s Institute for National Security Studies, Beni Sabti, tells the Sun. Perhaps one or more of [Qaani’s] top aides have been recruited by Israel, he says, adding that “psychological warfare” could well be stoking the rumor mill.

If so, prominent Iranians seem to be exacerbating the internal turmoil by alleging that the country’s security apparatus has been infiltrated.