During the Trump administration, the idea was proposed several times of creating an alliance of pro-U.S. Arab states, modeled loosely on NATO, that would provide collective security while requiring less active involvement from America. Given the renewed appreciation of NATO’s role in Europe, Kobi Michael and Yoel Guzansky renew the discussion, and consider where it would leave the Jewish state:

Israel has an interest, certainly in the short-to-medium range, in the establishment of an inter-Arab alliance that sees Israel as a reliable, involved, and influential associate, and perhaps later even a full partner, that will focus on the struggle against Iran’s involvement in Middle East countries and its growing influence in the region. If such an alliance becomes a reality, it will emphasize that the threat from Iran not only concerns its efforts to achieve nuclear weapons, but also its unending and violent struggle, including with the use of proxies, for regional hegemony.

Nevertheless, notwithstanding the Abraham Accords and the growing prominence given to cooperation, including on security matters, between Israel and the Gulf states, the road to the establishment of a joint fighting force that includes Israel is still long and obstacle-ridden. Although the Gulf states could derive many advantages from a military alliance with Israel, including a significant intelligence and military contribution, they could find themselves exposed to even more pressing Iranian threats. Any further rapprochement with Israel could be damaging for them. Moreover, it is hard to see the possibility of any Gulf readiness for such a military alliance without substantial American involvement or leadership, which means joining an American initiative as a coalition led by the United States.

For its part, Israel has no interest in restricting itself through obligations deriving from a military alliance in the classical sense, that is, committing to take part in conflicts that do not concern it. Furthermore, the establishment of a military alliance will affect the intimacy necessary for cooperation of this kind and likely lead to an Iranian response that Israel and the Gulf states wish to avoid.

While the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has never been friendly to Hamas, his government has objected strenuously to the Israeli campaign in the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip. Haisam Hassanein explains why:

Cairo has long been playing a double game, holding Hamas terrorists near while simultaneously trying to appear helpful to the United States and Israel. Israel taking control of Rafah threatens Egypt’s ability to exploit the chaos in Gaza, both to generate profits for regime insiders and so Cairo can pose as an indispensable mediator and preserve access to U.S. money and arms.

Egyptian security officials have looked the other way while Hamas and other Palestinian militants dug tunnels on the Egyptian-Gaza border. That gave Cairo the ability to use the situation in Gaza as a tool for regional influence and to ensure Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would not be eclipsed by regional competitors such as Qatar and Turkey.

Some elements close to the Sisi regime have benefited from Hamas control over Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Media reports indicate an Egyptian company run by one of Sisi’s close allies is making hundreds of millions of dollars by taxing Gazans fleeing the current conflict.

Moreover, writes Judith Miller, the Gaza war has been a godsend to the entire Egyptian economy, which was in dire straits last fall. Since October 7, the International Monetary Fund has given the country a much-needed injection of cash, since the U.S. and other Western countries believe it is a necessary intermediary and stabilizing force. Cairo therefore sees the continuation of the war, rather than an Israeli victory, as most desirable. Hassanein concludes:

Adding to its financial incentive, the Sisi regime views the Rafah crossing as a crucial card in preserving Cairo’s regional standing. Holding it increases Egypt’s relevance to countries that want to send aid to the Palestinians and ensures Washington stays quiet about Egypt’s gross human-rights violations so it can maintain a stable flow of U.S. assistance and weaponry. . . . No serious effort to turn the page on Hamas will yield the desired results without cutting this umbilical cord between the Sisi regime and Hamas.