During the past few months, the value of the Egyptian pound has plummeted, while Cairo struggles to impose austerity measures to prevent a fiscal catastrophe. Eran Lerman argues that further economic deterioration in the most populous Arab country could threaten the Jewish state:

[T]he continued stability of the political order in Egypt is among Israel’s most important national interests, if only because the alternative—the collapse of governance in a nation of 105 million on our border and possibly a full or partial takeover by radical totalitarian Islamists in the Sinai Peninsula and/or Egypt—would itself constitute a grave danger to Israel’s national security.

Moreover, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s regime—despite points of friction from time to time—has positioned itself as a constructive actor when it comes to Arab-Israeli normalization, joining the Negev Forum (alongside the U.S., Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco) and serving through its intelligence service as an effective go-between with Hamas on a range of issues, including the fate of Israelis and bodies held in Gaza. Egypt played a role in the Aqaba emergency meeting [last month to help reduce terrorism from the West Bank], and will host the next round.

While it is true that Cairo’s position on the Palestinian question remains unchanged, and its posture toward Israel in UN institutions remains quite hostile, cooperation in other aspects of the relationship, including the war on terror in Sinai, is closer than ever. The regime now claims to have achieved a decisive outcome in the struggle against the “Sinai Province” of Islamic State—to some extent, as it is willing to admit in private, with Israel’s help.

As Lerman goes on to explain, Jerusalem can assist Cairo in finding a way out of its current predicament. And, although the causes of Egypt’s economic woes are unlikely to dissipate anytime soon, there are a few reasons for hope.

Two weeks ago, a terrorist—most likely working for Hizballah—managed to cross into Israel from Lebanon and plant an explosive device near Megiddo that wounded a civilian. The attack, according to Matthew Levitt, is a sign of the Iran-backed militia’s increasing willingness to challenge the tacit understanding it has had with the IDF for over a decade. Such renewed aggression can also be found in the rhetoric of the group’s leaders:

In the lead-up to the 2006 war, [Hizballah’s] Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah famously miscalculated how Israel would respond to the cross-border abduction of its soldiers. According to Israeli analysts, however, he now believes he can predict the enemy’s behavior more accurately, leading him to sharpen his rhetoric and approve a series of increasingly aggressive actions over the past three years.

Nasrallah’s willingness to risk conflict with Israel was partly driven by domestic economic and political pressures. . . . Yet he also seemed to believe that Israel was unlikely to respond in a serious way to his threats given Hizballah’s enlarged precision-missile arsenal and air-defense systems.

In addition to the bombing, this month has seen increased reports of cross-border harassment against Israelis, such as aiming laser beams at drivers and homes, setting off loud explosions on the Lebanese frontier, and pouring sewage toward Israeli towns. Hizballah has also disrupted Israeli efforts to reinforce the security barrier in several spots along the Blue Line, [which serves as the de-facto border between Lebanon and the Jewish state].

This creeping aggressiveness—coupled with Nasrallah’s sense of having deterred Israel and weakened its military posture—indicate that Hizballah will continue trying to move the goalposts.