What Iran’s Navy Was Doing in Brazil, and Why the U.S. Should Be Worried

March 7 2023

On February 26, two Iranian warships docked in Rio de Janeiro, where they remained for a week—despite the Brazilian president Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva’s assurances to the U.S. that he would prevent them from doing so. Emanuele Ottolenghi explains the significance of the Islamic Republic’s naval mission to Brazil:

Lula has much to gain by standing up to America. He can burnish his credentials as a prominent leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, wresting that mantle away from his lesser regional competitors—Venezuela’s Maduro, Colombia’s Petro, and the Hernandez duo in Argentina. He can stoke feelings of national pride and bank on resentment for the “imperio del norte,” the northern empire, as many refer to America in the region. And he can forge a foreign policy of engagement with countries, like Iran, that seek to displace America’s influence in the region in favor of a multipolar world dominated by competing powers like Russia and China.

Tehran too greatly benefits from the visit. For decades, it has aspired to play a role in the Western Hemisphere, chiefly through soft-power influence operations and by cementing strategic relationships with anti-American regimes such as Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. And while its forays into Venezuela have yielded Tehran both a gateway to and a forward operating base in Latin America, making strides with countries traditionally within the sphere of U.S. political, military, and economic influence has been much more difficult.

The presence of two Iranian warships at Brazil’s iconic waterfront city is also meant to warn both the U.S. and Israel. For years, Iran has begrudged America’s regional presence and its role as the gendarme of the Gulf. Iran’s intended message is clear: we can poke you in your backyard, much like you poke us in ours. Iran’s puny blue-water fleet is currently no match for the U.S. But establishing bilateral relations with other navies around the world will help Iran expand its capabilities.

After Brazil, Iran’s navy task force will continue its voyage in the region, likely seeking to cross the Panama Canal. Arm-twisting Panama after nothing happened to Brazil is not in the cards. Besides, If Brazil faces no adverse consequences, more missions will return to build on this initial success.

Read more at Dispatch

More about: Brazil, Iran, U.S. Foreign policy

Expand Gaza into Sinai

Feb. 11 2025

Calling the proposal to depopulate Gaza completely (if temporarily) “unworkable,” Peter Berkowitz makes the case for a similar, but more feasible, plan:

The United States along with Saudi Arabia and the UAE should persuade Egypt by means of generous financial inducements to open the sparsely populated ten-to-fifteen miles of Sinai adjacent to Gaza to Palestinians seeking a fresh start and better life. Egypt would not absorb Gazans and make them citizens but rather move Gaza’s border . . . westward into Sinai. Fences would be erected along the new border. The Israel Defense Force would maintain border security on the Gaza-extension side, Egyptian forces on the other. Egypt might lease the land to the Palestinians for 75 years.

The Sinai option does not involve forced transfer of civilian populations, which the international laws of war bar. As the United States, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other partners build temporary dwellings and then apartment buildings and towns, they would provide bus service to the Gaza-extension. Palestinian families that choose to make the short trip would receive a key to a new residence and, say, $10,000.

The Sinai option is flawed. . . . Then again, all conventional options for rehabilitating and governing Gaza are terrible.

Read more at RealClear Politics

More about: Donald Trump, Egypt, Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula