On February 26, two Iranian warships docked in Rio de Janeiro, where they remained for a week—despite the Brazilian president Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva’s assurances to the U.S. that he would prevent them from doing so. Emanuele Ottolenghi explains the significance of the Islamic Republic’s naval mission to Brazil:

Lula has much to gain by standing up to America. He can burnish his credentials as a prominent leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, wresting that mantle away from his lesser regional competitors—Venezuela’s Maduro, Colombia’s Petro, and the Hernandez duo in Argentina. He can stoke feelings of national pride and bank on resentment for the “imperio del norte,” the northern empire, as many refer to America in the region. And he can forge a foreign policy of engagement with countries, like Iran, that seek to displace America’s influence in the region in favor of a multipolar world dominated by competing powers like Russia and China.

Tehran too greatly benefits from the visit. For decades, it has aspired to play a role in the Western Hemisphere, chiefly through soft-power influence operations and by cementing strategic relationships with anti-American regimes such as Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. And while its forays into Venezuela have yielded Tehran both a gateway to and a forward operating base in Latin America, making strides with countries traditionally within the sphere of U.S. political, military, and economic influence has been much more difficult.

The presence of two Iranian warships at Brazil’s iconic waterfront city is also meant to warn both the U.S. and Israel. For years, Iran has begrudged America’s regional presence and its role as the gendarme of the Gulf. Iran’s intended message is clear: we can poke you in your backyard, much like you poke us in ours. Iran’s puny blue-water fleet is currently no match for the U.S. But establishing bilateral relations with other navies around the world will help Iran expand its capabilities.

After Brazil, Iran’s navy task force will continue its voyage in the region, likely seeking to cross the Panama Canal. Arm-twisting Panama after nothing happened to Brazil is not in the cards. Besides, If Brazil faces no adverse consequences, more missions will return to build on this initial success.

If there’s one lesson to be learned from the history of the Israel-Arab conflict, it’s never to be confident that an end is in sight. Ehud Yaari nevertheless—and with all due caution—points to some noteworthy developments:

The absolute primacy of “armed struggle” in Palestinian discourse has discouraged any serious attempt to discuss or plan for a future Palestinian state. Palestinian political literature is devoid of any substantial debate over what kind of a state they aspire to create. What would be its economic, foreign, and social policies?

One significant exception was a seminar held by Hamas in Gaza—under the auspices of the late Yahya Sinwar—prior to October 7, 2023. The main focus of what was described as a brainstorming session was the question of how to deal with the Jews in the land to be liberated. A broad consensus between the participants was reached that most Israeli Jews should be eradicated or expelled while those contributing to Israel’s success in high tech and other critical domains would be forced to serve the new Palestinian authorities.

Yet, the ongoing aftershocks from the ongoing war in Gaza are posing questions among Palestinians concerning the viability of armed struggle. So far this trend is reflected mainly in stormy exchanges on social-media platforms and internal controversies within Hamas. There is mounting criticism leveled at the late Mohammad Deif and Yahya Sinwar for embarking upon an uncoordinated offensive that is resulting in a “Second Nakba”—a repeat of the defeat and mass displacement caused by launching the war in 1948.

To be sure, “armed struggle” is still being preached daily to the Palestinian communities by Iran and Iranian proxies, and at least half the Palestinian public—according to various polls—believe it remains indispensable. But doubts are being heard. We may be reaching a point where the Palestinians will feel compelled to make a choice between the road which led to past failures and an attempt to chart a new route. It will certainly require time and is bound to cause fractures and divisions, perhaps even a violent split, among the Palestinians.