Last month, a number of Israeli reservists—including air-force pilots, elite commandos, and cyberwarfare specialists—announced that they would not appear for their mandatory training rotations to protest the judicial reforms being considered by the Knesset. Fellow opponents of reform praised them for standing up for democracy; proponents of reform condemned them as traitors recklessly politicizing Israeli security. To Kobi Michael, the merits of judicial reform are beside the point: the boycott of reserve duty and the military’s handling of the situation, he argues, have seriously undermined the IDF.

[A]ny declaration of intent to stop volunteering is tantamount to a threat to paralyze [relevant] branches of the military or to disrupt severely their smooth operations, and undermines a unique model of service. . . . And so, a sea change has occurred. The IDF, against the wishes and not at the instigation of the top military leadership, but specifically because of the mishandling of developments within the military due to the political crisis, has become a political actor—the most influential actor in the public sphere in the reality of the current civil-political-moral debate.

Moreover, the military’s handling of this situation created a profound divide with the political leadership because of the severe damage to the political level’s faith in the military leadership and its response to the crisis. This will have a profound impact on future civil-military relations. The incident and the IDF response have scarred Israeli democracy, undermining the public consensus regarding the military and its apolitical standing, certainly when it comes to some of the most important branches of the military and the top echelons of the IDF leadership, which was perceived as supporting—or at the very least, willing to turn a blind eye to—the refusal to serve and, as a result, has become identified as opposing the judicial overhaul, even though none of the top officers have spoken about it.

It is hard to imagine, given the conditions that have been created, that this will not have an impact on the IDF’s recruitment model and on its standing as the “people’s army.”

For some time, opponents of U.S support for Israel have been urging the White House to end the war in Gaza, or simply calling for a ceasefire. Douglas Feith and Lewis Libby consider what such a result would actually entail:

Ending the war immediately would allow Hamas to survive and retain military and governing power. Leaving it in the area containing the Sinai-Gaza smuggling routes would ensure that Hamas can rearm. This is why Hamas leaders now plead for a ceasefire. A ceasefire will provide some relief for Gazans today, but a prolonged ceasefire will preserve Hamas’s bloody oppression of Gaza and make future wars with Israel inevitable.

For most Gazans, even when there is no hot war, Hamas’s dictatorship is a nightmarish tyranny. Hamas rule features the torture and murder of regime opponents, official corruption, extremist indoctrination of children, and misery for the population in general. Hamas diverts foreign aid and other resources from proper uses; instead of improving life for the mass of the people, it uses the funds to fight against Palestinians and Israelis.

Moreover, a Hamas-affiliated website warned Gazans last month against cooperating with Israel in securing and delivering the truckloads of aid flowing into the Strip. It promised to deal with those who do with “an iron fist.” In other words, if Hamas remains in power, it will begin torturing, imprisoning, or murdering those it deems collaborators the moment the war ends. Thereafter, Hamas will begin planning its next attack on Israel:

Hamas’s goals are to overshadow the Palestinian Authority, win control of the West Bank, and establish Hamas leadership over the Palestinian revolution. Hamas’s ultimate aim is to spark a regional war to obliterate Israel and, as Hamas leaders steadfastly maintain, fulfill a Quranic vision of killing all Jews.

Hamas planned for corpses of Palestinian babies and mothers to serve as the mainspring of its October 7 war plan. Hamas calculated it could survive a war against a superior Israeli force and energize enemies of Israel around the world. The key to both aims was arranging for grievous Palestinian civilian losses. . . . That element of Hamas’s war plan is working impressively.