The Palestinian Authority (PA) president Mahmoud Abbas and the Israeli government have a shared interest in dismantling the terrorist networks that have taken control of parts of Samaria. Yet Abbas has so far refused to engage diplomatically with Jerusalem—even though doing so could help solve some of his domestic problems. Eran Lerman suggests a diplomatic alternative:

Jordan, already the recipient of several waves of refugees—Palestinians in 1948, 1967, and 1991 (when hundreds of thousands were driven out of Kuwait), Iraqis in 1991 and 2003, and Syrians since the civil war began in 2013—has no wish to see escalating violence on the other side of the river leading to another such influx. Its recent apprehension of a terrorist cell intent on attacking Israeli targets indicates that despite vocal differences, and a poisonous public atmosphere, the Jordanian authorities are still committed to the mutual interest in preventing the spread of radical violence.

The prospect of the northern Samaria confrontation spilling over to the Gaza Strip is troubling for Egypt and would present President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi with severe dilemmas. The Egyptian leadership is also worried about the possible demise of the PA and a simultaneous rise in the power of Hamas and elements associated with the regime’s sworn enemies, the Muslim Brotherhood. Close coordination with Israel on important matters, such as warfare against Islamic State in Iraq, the Levant, and its “province” in Sinai, might be jeopardized.

If the present level of tension can subside, there can be other goals that Israel could bring [to the table], above all, the need for a change (on all sides) in the levels of hostility in the public domain. That is relevant not only regarding the Palestinian arena. In Jordan, members of parliament regularly engage in vicious incitement, for instance, glorifying in public the Egyptian policeman who crossed the border and killed three Israeli soldiers in a terrorist attack. The intensity of such virulence in Egypt has been somewhat modified in recent years but still leaves much to be desired.

In close coordination with the U.S.—[after] the present turbulence will have subsided—such issues, which closely relate to the conflict management mission of the process, can be carefully put on the table—not in order to needle the other side but in the context of hope for change.

For some time, opponents of U.S support for Israel have been urging the White House to end the war in Gaza, or simply calling for a ceasefire. Douglas Feith and Lewis Libby consider what such a result would actually entail:

Ending the war immediately would allow Hamas to survive and retain military and governing power. Leaving it in the area containing the Sinai-Gaza smuggling routes would ensure that Hamas can rearm. This is why Hamas leaders now plead for a ceasefire. A ceasefire will provide some relief for Gazans today, but a prolonged ceasefire will preserve Hamas’s bloody oppression of Gaza and make future wars with Israel inevitable.

For most Gazans, even when there is no hot war, Hamas’s dictatorship is a nightmarish tyranny. Hamas rule features the torture and murder of regime opponents, official corruption, extremist indoctrination of children, and misery for the population in general. Hamas diverts foreign aid and other resources from proper uses; instead of improving life for the mass of the people, it uses the funds to fight against Palestinians and Israelis.

Moreover, a Hamas-affiliated website warned Gazans last month against cooperating with Israel in securing and delivering the truckloads of aid flowing into the Strip. It promised to deal with those who do with “an iron fist.” In other words, if Hamas remains in power, it will begin torturing, imprisoning, or murdering those it deems collaborators the moment the war ends. Thereafter, Hamas will begin planning its next attack on Israel:

Hamas’s goals are to overshadow the Palestinian Authority, win control of the West Bank, and establish Hamas leadership over the Palestinian revolution. Hamas’s ultimate aim is to spark a regional war to obliterate Israel and, as Hamas leaders steadfastly maintain, fulfill a Quranic vision of killing all Jews.

Hamas planned for corpses of Palestinian babies and mothers to serve as the mainspring of its October 7 war plan. Hamas calculated it could survive a war against a superior Israeli force and energize enemies of Israel around the world. The key to both aims was arranging for grievous Palestinian civilian losses. . . . That element of Hamas’s war plan is working impressively.