Setting the Record Straight about Israelis Refusing Military Service

July 25 2023

In recent weeks, the Israeli media have run story after story about groups of citizens declaring that they will refuse to show up for reserve duty until the government relents on its plans to reform the Supreme Court. The reservists in question oftentimes belong to especially important IDF units. But, David M. Weinberg explains, the problem is not nearly so widespread or serious as one might think:

First, I suspect that the numbers are fuzzy and exaggerated. In fact, a deeper dive indicates that very many of the purportedly AWOL soldiers are long retired from reserve service of any type. This reality became clear in a rare television news segment on Wednesday night where Yair Pelei, the Golani Brigade’s commander, stripped the refuse-to-serve festival of its factual moorings. Hundreds of Golani reservists are currently participating in a massive training exercise on the Golan Heights. Not a single reserve soldier refused to show up for duty, Pelei said.

Second is the fact that for every refuse-to-serve declaration highlighted by the mainstream . . . media there is an equal if not much greater number of petitions and declarations out there against . . . avowals to refuse to serve.

By my count—and I did my homework in tabulating this—well over 100,000 Israeli active-duty and reserve military personnel are on record as rejecting the calls to refuse to serve. [Last] week, 150 very senior IDF military-intelligence reserve officers published a public call against refusal to serve; a call to leave the IDF out of and beyond political debate; and a call on all military-intelligence personnel to answer with enthusiasm and vigor, as always, all draft calls for reserve duty.

Read more at Israel Hayom

More about: IDF, Israeli Judicial Reform, Israeli politics, Israeli society

Israel’s Syria Strategy in a Changing Middle East

In a momentous meeting with the Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh, President Trump announced that he is lifting sanctions on the beleaguered and war-torn country. On the one hand, Sharaa is an alumnus of Islamic State and al-Qaeda, who came to power as commander of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which itself began life as al-Qaeda’s Syrian offshoot; he also seems to enjoy the support of Qatar. On the other hand, he overthrew the Assad regime—a feat made possible by the battering Israel delivered to Hizballah—greatly improving Jerusalem’s strategic position, and ending one of the world’s most atrocious and brutal tyrannies. President Trump also announced that he hopes Syria will join the Abraham Accords.

This analysis by Eran Lerman was published a few days ago, and in some respects is already out of date, but more than anything else I’ve read it helps to make sense of Israel’s strategic position vis-à-vis Syria.

Israel’s primary security interest lies in defending against worst-case scenarios, particularly the potential collapse of the Syrian state or its transformation into an actively hostile force backed by a significant Turkish presence (considering that the Turkish military is the second largest in NATO) with all that this would imply. Hence the need to bolster the new buffer zone—not for territorial gain, but as a vital shield and guarantee against dangerous developments. Continued airstrikes aimed at diminishing the residual components of strategic military capabilities inherited from the Assad regime are essential.

At the same time, there is a need to create conditions that would enable those in Damascus who wish to reject the reduction of their once-proud country into a Turkish satrapy. Sharaa’s efforts to establish his legitimacy, including his visit to Paris and outreach to the U.S., other European nations, and key Gulf countries, may generate positive leverage in this regard. Israel’s role is to demonstrate through daily actions the severe costs of acceding to Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ambitions and accepting Turkish hegemony.

Israel should also assist those in Syria (and beyond: this may have an effect in Lebanon as well) who look to it as a strategic anchor in the region. The Druze in Syria—backed by their brethren in Israel—have openly expressed this expectation, breaking decades of loyalty to the central power in Damascus over their obligation to their kith and kin.

Read more at Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security

More about: Donald Trump, Israeli Security, Syria, U.S. Foreign policy