In December, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution requesting that the International Court of Justice (ICJ)—a UN body tasked with resolving disputes between states—issue an advisory opinion on the Israeli presence in “the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967.” This very phrase, which assumes that the land in question is Palestinian in a legal sense rather than territory occupied first by Jordan and then by Israel, both prejudices the outcome and bespeaks carelessness about the finer points of international law. The details of the request only accentuate these problems. Orde Kittrie and Bruce Rashkow explain that the ruling the ICJ is poised to issue stands not only to undermine the very basis of the Oslo Accords and of the court’s legitimacy, but also to do serious damage to the laws of war:

While international law prohibits the permanent acquisition by force of the territory of another state, it does not prohibit an interim occupation, which results from a legal use of force in self-defense, pending resolution of the conflict. The 1907 Hague Regulations and 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention both provide for and regulate such occupations. Neither requires an occupier whose occupation results from a legal use of force in self-defense to withdraw before a peace treaty is signed.

In 1967, the international community recognized the legality of Israel’s preemptive action against Arab armies poised to attack. Draft resolutions condemning Israel’s actions were resoundingly defeated in both the UN Security Council and General Assembly.

The expected ICJ ruling—the one the General Assembly’s request was designed to elicit—that any Israeli presence in the West Bank or east Jerusalem is illegal would therefore require an immediate Israeli withdrawal. Setting aside the unlikelihood that the Jewish state would abide by the ruling, as well as the catastrophic consequences doing so would have for Israel, Jordan, and the civilian population of the West Bank, the decision would render moot both the Oslo Accords and prior UN resolutions.

Kittrie and Rashkow explain that “the Oslo I Accord . . . affirmed the Security Council’s ‘land for peace’ framework, set forth in two binding resolutions,” which requires that the two sides engage in “negotiations . . . leading to a permanent settlement” of the conflict. The prospective ICJ ruling obviates the need for such negotiations. And that’s not all:

An ICJ opinion that international law requires Israel to withdraw from the disputed territories without any Palestinian concessions on any of the permanent-status issues would make it far more difficult or even impossible for Palestinian leaders to compromise with Israel on such issues. Since Israel will inevitably decline to withdraw unilaterally, the advisory opinion will, in addition to undercutting compromise-minded Palestinians, create yet another Israeli “violation” with which activists can demand anti-Israel boycotts, divestment, and sanctions. Given the practical realities, that is presumably the real objective of the General Assembly request’s architects.

The pending ICJ advisory proceedings also threaten to expand upon the dangerous precedent . . . that the General Assembly and ICJ can use advisory opinions to circumvent the sovereign right of nation states to determine whether to submit to the Court a particular dispute to which they are a party.

On Tuesday, representatives of Hamas met with their counterparts from Fatah—the faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) once led by Yasir Arafat that now governs parts of the West Bank—in Beijing to discuss possible reconciliation. While it is unlikely that these talks will yield any more progress than the many previous rounds, they constitute a significant step in China’s increasing attempts to involve itself in the Middle East on the side of Israel’s enemies.

By contrast, writes Tuvia Gering, Taiwan has been quick and consistent in its condemnations of Hamas and Iran and its expressions of sympathy with Israel:

Support from Taipei goes beyond words. Taiwan’s appointee in Tel Aviv and de-facto ambassador, Abby Lee, has been busy aiding hostage families, adopting the most affected kibbutzim in southern Israel, and volunteering with farmers. Taiwan recently pledged more than half a million dollars to Israel for critical initiatives, including medical and communications supplies for local municipalities. This follows earlier aid from Taiwan to an organization helping Israeli soldiers and families immediately after the October 7 attack.

The reasons why are not hard to fathom:

In many ways, Taiwan sees a reflection of itself in Israel—two vibrant democracies facing threats from hostile neighbors. Both nations wield substantial economic and technological prowess, and both heavily depend on U.S. military exports and diplomacy. Taipei also sees Israel as a “role model” for what Taiwan should aspire to be, citing its unwavering determination and capabilities to defend itself.

On a deeper level, Taiwanese leaders seem to view Israel’s war with Hamas and Iran as an extension of a greater struggle between democracy and autocracy.

Gering urges Israel to reciprocate these expressions of friendship and to take into account that “China has been going above and beyond to demonize the Jewish state in international forums.” Above all, he writes, Jerusalem should “take a firmer stance against China’s support for Hamas and Iran-backed terrorism, exposing the hypocrisy and repression that underpin its vision for a new global order.”