As recently released economic data confirm, high-tech in its various forms continues to play a critical role in Israel’s economic success. Gabi Siboni traces how this came about—looking especially to the role of the IDF—and examines the risks as well as benefits of the current situation:

The basic concept of security formulated by David Ben-Gurion in the early years of the state rested on three pillars: deterrence, early warning, and decisive victory. Maintaining a sizeable regular military was practically impossible, so early warning was required to gather the reserve units. This constraint obliged the IDF to establish a sophisticated intelligence system to provide early warning. The intelligence units of the IDF were required to develop diverse capabilities. The information revolution and the development of technology caused intelligence to be based more and more on technological capabilities in cyberspace.

In addition, conscription for the IDF is an essential element in developing the technological environment in Israel. The specialized units in the IDF begin the selection process at very early stages and enjoy access to the highest-quality personnel resources of the state of Israel. . . . However, there’s a catch: the youth’s pursuit of the technological units does contribute to the skills of Israeli intelligence and the state’s economy, but it harms the motivation to recruit into the fighting units.

According to an internal survey conducted in the IDF, the motivation for combat service for men in 2022 was the lowest in recent years—66 percent compared with 73 percent in 2020. For women, it was 48 percent in 2022, compared with 60 percent in 2018. The continuation of this trend is very disturbing.

A senior commander in the IDF previously stated that the decrease in motivation to serve in the field units is a result of the shift to the technological units of the best youth when the center of gravity of the service moves from the fighting field units to the special units and to those serving in the intelligence and technological units. As a result, the combat units must make do with those who failed or could not integrate into the personnel selection processes for the special units, the prestigious courses, and the technological and intelligence array.

With the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program damaged, and its regional influence diminished, the U.S. must now prevent it from recovering, and, if possible, weaken it further. Benjamin Baird argues that it can do both through economic means—if Congress does its part:

Legislation that codifies President Donald Trump’s “maximum pressure” policies into law, places sanctions on Iran’s energy sales, and designates the regime’s proxy armies as foreign terrorist organizations will go a long way toward containing Iran’s regime and encouraging its downfall. . . . Congress has already introduced much of the legislation needed to bring the ayatollah to his knees, and committee chairmen need only hold markup hearings to advance these bills and send them to the House and Senate floors.

They should start with the HR 2614—the Maximum Support Act. What the Iranian people truly need to overcome the regime is protection from the state security apparatus.

Next, Congress must get to work dismantling Iran’s proxy army in Iraq. By sanctioning and designating a list of 29 Iran-backed Iraqi militias through the Florida representative Greg Steube’s Iranian Terror Prevention Act, the U.S. can shut down . . . groups like the Badr Organization and Kataib Hizballah, which are part of the Iranian-sponsored armed groups responsible for killing hundreds of American service members.

Those same militias are almost certainly responsible for a series of drone attacks on oilfields in Iraq over the past few days