As recently released economic data confirm, high-tech in its various forms continues to play a critical role in Israel’s economic success. Gabi Siboni traces how this came about—looking especially to the role of the IDF—and examines the risks as well as benefits of the current situation:

The basic concept of security formulated by David Ben-Gurion in the early years of the state rested on three pillars: deterrence, early warning, and decisive victory. Maintaining a sizeable regular military was practically impossible, so early warning was required to gather the reserve units. This constraint obliged the IDF to establish a sophisticated intelligence system to provide early warning. The intelligence units of the IDF were required to develop diverse capabilities. The information revolution and the development of technology caused intelligence to be based more and more on technological capabilities in cyberspace.

In addition, conscription for the IDF is an essential element in developing the technological environment in Israel. The specialized units in the IDF begin the selection process at very early stages and enjoy access to the highest-quality personnel resources of the state of Israel. . . . However, there’s a catch: the youth’s pursuit of the technological units does contribute to the skills of Israeli intelligence and the state’s economy, but it harms the motivation to recruit into the fighting units.

According to an internal survey conducted in the IDF, the motivation for combat service for men in 2022 was the lowest in recent years—66 percent compared with 73 percent in 2020. For women, it was 48 percent in 2022, compared with 60 percent in 2018. The continuation of this trend is very disturbing.

A senior commander in the IDF previously stated that the decrease in motivation to serve in the field units is a result of the shift to the technological units of the best youth when the center of gravity of the service moves from the fighting field units to the special units and to those serving in the intelligence and technological units. As a result, the combat units must make do with those who failed or could not integrate into the personnel selection processes for the special units, the prestigious courses, and the technological and intelligence array.

Examining the effects of Iran’s decision to launch nearly 200 ballistic missiles at Israel on October 1, Benny Morris takes stock of the Jewish state’s strategic situation:

The massive Iranian attack has turned what began as a local war in and around the Gaza Strip and then expanded into a Hamas–Hizballah–Houthi–Israeli war [into] a regional war with wide and possibly calamitous international repercussions.

Before the Iranians launched their attack, Washington warned Tehran to desist (“don’t,” in President Biden’s phrase), and Israel itself had reportedly cautioned the Iranians secretly that such an attack would trigger a devastating Israeli counterstrike. But a much-humiliated Iran went ahead, nonetheless.

For Israel, the way forward seems to lie in an expansion of the war—in the north or south or both—until the country attains some sort of victory, or a diplomatic settlement is reached. A “victory” would mean forcing Hizballah to cease fire in exchange, say, for a cessation of the IDF bombing campaign and withdrawal to the international border, or forcing Iran, after suffering real pain from IDF attacks, to cease its attacks and rein in its proxies: Hizballah, Hamas, and the Houthis.

At the same time, writes Morris, a victory along such lines would still have its limits:

An IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon and a cessation of Israeli air-force bombing would result in Hizballah’s resurgence and its re-investment of southern Lebanon down to the border. Neither the Americans nor the French nor the UN nor the Lebanese army—many of whose troops are Shiites who support Hizballah—would fight them.