Less than a month after the United Arab Emirates announced its plans to normalize its relationship with Israel, the island kingdom of Bahrain declared its intention to follow suit. As the third anniversary of the Abraham Accords approaches, Ilan Zalayat and Yoel Guzansky take stock of relations between Jerusalem and Manama:

[When the Accords] were signed in 2020, about 40 percent of Bahrainis held a favorable view, but in subsequent polls this rate fell by 50 percent. The fluctuation shows that opposition to normalization is not inevitable, and is possibly the result of the gap between expectations and reality that arose in the three years that have passed.

The political-security aspect [of normalization] recorded immediate and impressive progress. Within eighteen months of establishing relations, Bahrain was visited by then-Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, Foreign Minister Yair Lapid, Defense Minister Benny Gantz, and Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi, who all met with senior members of the royal house and the Bahraini army to discuss security collaboration between the countries. Public visits by Israeli officials to the tiny kingdom, about 150 kilometers from the Iranian coast, and the sharing of intelligence and drone technology, sent a clear message that Israel and Bahrain were standing together against Iran.

However, the economic aspect of relations lagged behind. Figures from the Central Bureau of Statistics show that while trade between the UAE and Israel in 2021-2022 (excluding diamonds and services) amounted to about $2.5 billion, trade with Bahrain was worth only $20 million. . . . Economic ties are important to the Bahraini people and more palpable than security contacts with Israel. Forty percent of Bahrainis are ready for some business contacts with Israel that would be beneficial to the local economy, compared to only a tenth who are interested in cooperating with Israel against Iran.

The potential economic reward could reach sectors in Bahrain that are outside the ruling classes, for whom normalization not only means violating solidarity with the Palestinians, but also fails to bring the expected financial gain, and persuade them that there are advantages to relations.

Robert Satloff has some harsh words for the U.S. government in this regard, words I take especially seriously because Satloff is someone inclined to political moderation. Why, he asks, have American diplomats failed to achieve anything in their endless rounds of talks in Doha and Cairo? Because

there is simply not enough pressure on Hamas to change course, accept a deal, and release the remaining October 7 hostages, stuck in nightmarish captivity. . . . In this environment, why should Hamas change course?

Publicly, the U.S. should bite the bullet and urge Israel to complete the main battle operations in Gaza—i.e., the Rafah operation—as swiftly and efficiently as possible. We should be assertively assisting with the humanitarian side of this.

Satloff had more to say about the hostages, especially the five American ones, in a speech he gave recently:

I am ashamed—ashamed of how we have allowed the story of the hostages to get lost in the noise of the war that followed their capture; ashamed of how we have permitted their release to be a bargaining chip in some larger political negotiation; ashamed of how we have failed to give them the respect and dignity and our wholehearted demand for Red Cross access and care and medicine that is our normal, usual demand for hostages.

If they were taken by Boko Haram, everyone would know their name. If they were taken by the Taliban, everyone would tie a yellow ribbon around a tree for them. If they were taken by Islamic State, kids would learn about them in school.

It is repugnant to see their freedom as just one item on the bargaining table with Hamas, as though they were chattel. These are Americans—and they deserve to be backed by the full faith and credit of the United States.