The Biden Administration Caved to Hizballah in a Dispute with Israel—and No One Noticed

In the northwestern part of the Golan Heights, abutting the Lebanese border, there is a small strip of land—about seven miles long and two wide—known in Hebrew as Har Dov and in Arabic as Shebaa Farms. Israel acquired the territory from Syria, along with the rest of the Golan, in the Six-Day War. Since the IDF’s withdrawal from South Lebanon in May 2000, Hizballah has revived a legal dispute going back to the 1920s—claiming that Har Dov is in fact Lebanese territory illegitimately seized by Syria in the 1950s. By pressing this claim, the Iran-backed terrorist group can maintain that it still has a territorial dispute with Jerusalem to prosecute on Beirut’s behalf.

With this background, it is possible to understand the significance of a clause buried in UN Security Council  Resolution 2695, passed on August 31, that went entirely unnoticed by observers. Tony Badran explains:

A few months ago, Hizballah set up an outpost in the Har Dov region. . . . Hizballah orchestrated a full-blown campaign around this calculated move, which pro-Hizballah media framed as a response to Israel capitalizing on Donald Trump’s recognition of its sovereignty over the Golan [in 2019]. The purpose of the campaign, Hizballah’s leader made clear, was to force the reopening of the border file, from the coast to the Shebaa Farms.

UNSC Resolution 2695 [renewed] the mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). . . . The [Biden] administration also put on a big show about upholding a provision in the resolution allowing UNIFIL to conduct patrols independently, without coordination with or prior authorization from the Lebanese authorities—practically meaningless language, evidenced, if nothing else, from UNIFIL’s typically terrible record over the past year, even though the previous resolution renewing its mandate explicitly authorized it to conduct unannounced patrols independently.

In that resolution, the U.S. government agreed for the first time to the introduction of language in the UNSCR referring to “the occupied Shebaa Farms.” Since the U.S. does not consider the farms to be Lebanese, but rather a part of the Golan Heights, the Biden administration had effectively reversed the official American position recognizing Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights, without having to make an official policy announcement.

Read more at Tablet

More about: Golan Heights, Hizballah, Joseph Biden, U.S.-Israel relationship, United Nations

 

Iran’s Options for Revenge on Israel

On April 1, an Israeli airstrike on Damascus killed three Iranian generals, one of whom was the seniormost Iranian commander in the region. The IDF has been targeting Iranian personnel and weaponry in Syria for over a decade, but the killing of such a high-ranking figure raises the stakes significantly. In the past several days, Israelis have received a number of warnings both from the press and from the home-front command to ready themselves for retaliatory attacks. Jonathan Spyer considers what shape that attack might take:

Tehran has essentially four broad options. It could hit an Israeli or Jewish facility overseas using either Iranian state forces (option one), or proxies (option two). . . . Then there’s the third option: Tehran could also direct its proxies to strike Israel directly. . . . Finally, Iran could strike Israeli soil directly (option four). It is the riskiest option for Tehran, and would be likely to precipitate open war between the regime and Israel.

Tehran will consider all four options carefully. It has failed to retaliate in kind for a number of high-profile assassinations of its operatives in recent years. . . . A failure to respond, or staging too small a response, risks conveying a message of weakness. Iran usually favors using proxies over staging direct attacks. In an unkind formulation common in Israel, Tehran is prepared to “fight to the last Arab.”

Read more at Spectator

More about: Iran, Israeli Security, Syria