On Monday, the Israeli government screened footage—much of which was recorded by the perpetrators—of the atrocities of October 7 to members of the foreign press. The week before, it shared hard forensic evidence as well. The purpose of these unprecedented steps was to counteract the claims, which still persist, that the horrors of that day were fabricated or exaggerated. David Schraub, writing just a few days after the attacks, labels these claims of Israeli perfidy “epistemic anti-Semitism.” He explains:

When Jews say they see anti-Semitism, epistemic anti-Semites immediately see the real issue as those victimized by an undoubtedly false allegation.

[Thus] some social-media commentators raced as fast as possible to the position that any reports of “beheadings” were pure propaganda, an intentional trick to discredit Hamas (as if they needed the help!), and those who shared them were either unwitting pawns or willing participants in a Zionist conspiracy.

That move—not, to reiterate, any professional insistence on needing more confirmation before resharing the allegations—seems to me directly linked to holding a default position of skepticism if not antipathy towards Jewish claim-makers (which is why, even though now we are seeing multiple direct, eyewitness accounts confirming the story, plenty still are holding fast to the notion that they can’t be trusted).

The goal is to present Jewish testimony as presumptively suspect—not just the baseline “skepticism” that might greet any claim before proof is supplied, but a specific insistence that Jewish testimony in particular is probably part of a plot.

While the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has never been friendly to Hamas, his government has objected strenuously to the Israeli campaign in the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip. Haisam Hassanein explains why:

Cairo has long been playing a double game, holding Hamas terrorists near while simultaneously trying to appear helpful to the United States and Israel. Israel taking control of Rafah threatens Egypt’s ability to exploit the chaos in Gaza, both to generate profits for regime insiders and so Cairo can pose as an indispensable mediator and preserve access to U.S. money and arms.

Egyptian security officials have looked the other way while Hamas and other Palestinian militants dug tunnels on the Egyptian-Gaza border. That gave Cairo the ability to use the situation in Gaza as a tool for regional influence and to ensure Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would not be eclipsed by regional competitors such as Qatar and Turkey.

Some elements close to the Sisi regime have benefited from Hamas control over Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Media reports indicate an Egyptian company run by one of Sisi’s close allies is making hundreds of millions of dollars by taxing Gazans fleeing the current conflict.

Moreover, writes Judith Miller, the Gaza war has been a godsend to the entire Egyptian economy, which was in dire straits last fall. Since October 7, the International Monetary Fund has given the country a much-needed injection of cash, since the U.S. and other Western countries believe it is a necessary intermediary and stabilizing force. Cairo therefore sees the continuation of the war, rather than an Israeli victory, as most desirable. Hassanein concludes:

Adding to its financial incentive, the Sisi regime views the Rafah crossing as a crucial card in preserving Cairo’s regional standing. Holding it increases Egypt’s relevance to countries that want to send aid to the Palestinians and ensures Washington stays quiet about Egypt’s gross human-rights violations so it can maintain a stable flow of U.S. assistance and weaponry. . . . No serious effort to turn the page on Hamas will yield the desired results without cutting this umbilical cord between the Sisi regime and Hamas.