Robert Satloff, like Baratz, sees parallels between the current conflict and the War of Independence, primarily due to the existential threat to the Jewish state. With that in mind, he explains how the U.S. can best come to the aid of its closest Middle Eastern ally:

Yes, Israelis remain keen to win the freedom of the 200 women, men, children, elderly, and mentally ill held by Hamas, but they don’t seem in a mood to let their captivity prevent the strategic necessity of wiping out Hamas—a necessity for its own sake as well as for two other reasons: to restore Israelis’ confidence in the competence of their government and army, and to restore Israel’s badly dented deterrence in the minds of friends and adversaries around the Middle East. . . .

Washington’s most helpful role is to help Israel complete the task as quickly as possible, at the least cost to civilian life as possible. In practical terms, this will demand more U.S. support for Israel, not less, and that will require even more political courage from President Biden and his administration in the months ahead—courage to buck up wobbly allies; courage to ignore the jeremiads of self-righteous columnists; courage to face down critics in his own party. And, lest we forget, Biden will need courage to insulate this conflict and make sure the regional situation, horrific as it is, doesn’t get worse—imagine, for example, trying to deter the opening of a second front if Iran already had a nuclear bomb. I pray the old man from Scranton has it in him.

While the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has never been friendly to Hamas, his government has objected strenuously to the Israeli campaign in the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip. Haisam Hassanein explains why:

Cairo has long been playing a double game, holding Hamas terrorists near while simultaneously trying to appear helpful to the United States and Israel. Israel taking control of Rafah threatens Egypt’s ability to exploit the chaos in Gaza, both to generate profits for regime insiders and so Cairo can pose as an indispensable mediator and preserve access to U.S. money and arms.

Egyptian security officials have looked the other way while Hamas and other Palestinian militants dug tunnels on the Egyptian-Gaza border. That gave Cairo the ability to use the situation in Gaza as a tool for regional influence and to ensure Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would not be eclipsed by regional competitors such as Qatar and Turkey.

Some elements close to the Sisi regime have benefited from Hamas control over Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Media reports indicate an Egyptian company run by one of Sisi’s close allies is making hundreds of millions of dollars by taxing Gazans fleeing the current conflict.

Moreover, writes Judith Miller, the Gaza war has been a godsend to the entire Egyptian economy, which was in dire straits last fall. Since October 7, the International Monetary Fund has given the country a much-needed injection of cash, since the U.S. and other Western countries believe it is a necessary intermediary and stabilizing force. Cairo therefore sees the continuation of the war, rather than an Israeli victory, as most desirable. Hassanein concludes:

Adding to its financial incentive, the Sisi regime views the Rafah crossing as a crucial card in preserving Cairo’s regional standing. Holding it increases Egypt’s relevance to countries that want to send aid to the Palestinians and ensures Washington stays quiet about Egypt’s gross human-rights violations so it can maintain a stable flow of U.S. assistance and weaponry. . . . No serious effort to turn the page on Hamas will yield the desired results without cutting this umbilical cord between the Sisi regime and Hamas.