Israel and Hamas have agreed to extend the ceasefire until Thursday, with ten hostages to be released today and another ten tomorrow. But the longer the ceasefire lasts, the more international pressure there will be on Jerusalem not to resume the fighting, and the more Hamas will have done to resupply its forces and to position them to defend more effectively against the IDF’s attacks. Seth Cropsey and Austen Maggin explain the dangers of a longer-term pause in hostilities:

The stated objective of stalling ongoing operations is to allow for time to convince Hamas to release [more] hostages and to deliver emergency resources to Gazan civilians. The implication is that these objectives are worth prolonging the conflict and allowing Hamas to regroup, which in reality will only increase both Israeli and Gazan casualties.

Whether these objectives are worth the implied costs is immaterial: the objectives themselves are chimerical. At best, Hamas will release only a portion of its hostages, its best source of leverage. . . . There is [likewise] no reason to believe that what proved impossible in peace can now be done in war—a guarantee that emergency aid reaches Gazan civilians. That Hamas sits on a massive store of resources stolen from the billions of dollars of international aid seems to be of little consequence, as does the fact that prolonging the conflict only increases the suffering inflicted on Gaza’s population and delays reconstruction of local society and infrastructure.

But the longer the war in Gaza continues, the more likely that war will spread due to miscalculations and increased pressure on Iran or its proxies to back up their ideological commitments with force. Thus, the only beneficiary from a pause is Hamas.

Thus, Cropsey and Maggin go on to argue, a longer-lasting ceasefire, like so many measures endorsed by the so-called pro-Palestinian camp, will only aggravate the suffering of Israelis and Palestinians alike.

While the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has never been friendly to Hamas, his government has objected strenuously to the Israeli campaign in the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip. Haisam Hassanein explains why:

Cairo has long been playing a double game, holding Hamas terrorists near while simultaneously trying to appear helpful to the United States and Israel. Israel taking control of Rafah threatens Egypt’s ability to exploit the chaos in Gaza, both to generate profits for regime insiders and so Cairo can pose as an indispensable mediator and preserve access to U.S. money and arms.

Egyptian security officials have looked the other way while Hamas and other Palestinian militants dug tunnels on the Egyptian-Gaza border. That gave Cairo the ability to use the situation in Gaza as a tool for regional influence and to ensure Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would not be eclipsed by regional competitors such as Qatar and Turkey.

Some elements close to the Sisi regime have benefited from Hamas control over Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Media reports indicate an Egyptian company run by one of Sisi’s close allies is making hundreds of millions of dollars by taxing Gazans fleeing the current conflict.

Moreover, writes Judith Miller, the Gaza war has been a godsend to the entire Egyptian economy, which was in dire straits last fall. Since October 7, the International Monetary Fund has given the country a much-needed injection of cash, since the U.S. and other Western countries believe it is a necessary intermediary and stabilizing force. Cairo therefore sees the continuation of the war, rather than an Israeli victory, as most desirable. Hassanein concludes:

Adding to its financial incentive, the Sisi regime views the Rafah crossing as a crucial card in preserving Cairo’s regional standing. Holding it increases Egypt’s relevance to countries that want to send aid to the Palestinians and ensures Washington stays quiet about Egypt’s gross human-rights violations so it can maintain a stable flow of U.S. assistance and weaponry. . . . No serious effort to turn the page on Hamas will yield the desired results without cutting this umbilical cord between the Sisi regime and Hamas.