Yesterday, Hamas released an additional twelve hostages (ten Israeli citizens and two Thai) in exchange for an additional day of the ceasefire, and the same arrangement is expected to persist today. These deals are the product of constant negotiations in Qatar involving Washington, Jerusalem, Cairo, and Hamas. What remains unclear is Iran’s involvement in these negotiations, over which it certainly has some influence. It’s also worth noting that attacks by Iran-backed militias on U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria have ceased since the ceasefire took effect.

As background to making sense of all this, we have Matthew Levitt’s overview of the relationship between Iran and Hamas, which dates back to the latter’s founding in 1987, when the Islamic Republic began providing it with ample funds:

Hamas was reluctant in its early years to accept too much money from Iran for fear of being bound to the expectations and instructions of Tehran. But the increase in Iranian funding for Hamas in May 2004 came just weeks after the assassination of Hamas leader Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi.

Iran’s provision of support to Hamas has continued to grow over time, especially after Hamas took over the Gaza Strip by force from fellow Palestinians in 2007. According to a 2010 U.S. Department of Defense report on Iran’s military power, Iran provided Hizballah and several Palestinian terrorist groups—including Hamas—“with funding, weapons, and training to oppose Israel.” . . . Today, U.S. and Israeli officials estimate that Iran provides Hamas at least $70 million to $100 million a year.

For decades, Iran, a U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism, has provided a wide range of material support to Hamas, without which Hamas could never have become the capable and deadly terrorist organization it is today. . . . Tehran played a critical role in creating the monster that is Hamas, which is why Iran shares the blame and responsibility for the brutal attack.

While the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has never been friendly to Hamas, his government has objected strenuously to the Israeli campaign in the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip. Haisam Hassanein explains why:

Cairo has long been playing a double game, holding Hamas terrorists near while simultaneously trying to appear helpful to the United States and Israel. Israel taking control of Rafah threatens Egypt’s ability to exploit the chaos in Gaza, both to generate profits for regime insiders and so Cairo can pose as an indispensable mediator and preserve access to U.S. money and arms.

Egyptian security officials have looked the other way while Hamas and other Palestinian militants dug tunnels on the Egyptian-Gaza border. That gave Cairo the ability to use the situation in Gaza as a tool for regional influence and to ensure Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would not be eclipsed by regional competitors such as Qatar and Turkey.

Some elements close to the Sisi regime have benefited from Hamas control over Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Media reports indicate an Egyptian company run by one of Sisi’s close allies is making hundreds of millions of dollars by taxing Gazans fleeing the current conflict.

Moreover, writes Judith Miller, the Gaza war has been a godsend to the entire Egyptian economy, which was in dire straits last fall. Since October 7, the International Monetary Fund has given the country a much-needed injection of cash, since the U.S. and other Western countries believe it is a necessary intermediary and stabilizing force. Cairo therefore sees the continuation of the war, rather than an Israeli victory, as most desirable. Hassanein concludes:

Adding to its financial incentive, the Sisi regime views the Rafah crossing as a crucial card in preserving Cairo’s regional standing. Holding it increases Egypt’s relevance to countries that want to send aid to the Palestinians and ensures Washington stays quiet about Egypt’s gross human-rights violations so it can maintain a stable flow of U.S. assistance and weaponry. . . . No serious effort to turn the page on Hamas will yield the desired results without cutting this umbilical cord between the Sisi regime and Hamas.