On May 22, 1967, Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran—which connect the Gulf of Aqaba and the Israeli port of Eilat to the Red Sea. This move, together with the repositioning of Egyptian forces to attack Israel, precipitated the Six-Day War. In the past several days, Houthi rebels in Yemen have attempted something far more consequential: closing the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and thus blockading the entire Red Sea, cutting off not just Eilat but also the Suez Canal.

The U.S. has responded to this threat to global commerce by moving an aircraft carrier to the nearby Gulf of Aden. On Friday alone, there were two separate Houthi assaults on commercial vessels, and on Saturday an American destroyer shot down fourteen attack drones launched by the Iran-backed terrorist group. Asher Orkaby comments:

Piracy and terrorist organizations at the southern gates of the Red Sea are not a new phenomenon. Recent Houthi attacks on Israeli shipping, however, aim not for plunder, ransom, or political demands. The perpetrators seek only propaganda victories, a far more dangerous goal and one without the ability to be mitigated by diplomatic appeasement.

A strong defensive posture coordinated by the United States and other naval powers with a presence in the region is the most effective route towards ensuring immediate Red Sea maritime security. . . . Defensive measures cannot, however, bring about a permanent solution to Red Sea insecurity. Houthi militias continue to mount Red Sea attacks, both against Israeli shipping and other national civilian vessels, as part of a propaganda campaign and to pressure the international community to recognize Houthi power and authority in South Arabia.

Rather than offer the Houthis political recognition, the international community should ultimately recognize the unfortunate fact that even when faced with the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, Houthi leadership would rather invest treasure and human capital in seeking a propaganda victory against Israel than feed its own population. Such a group should not be normalized, nor should it be invited to the negotiating table as an equal and legitimate partner for Yemeni leadership. To do so would risk dragging the southern Red Sea through years of conflict and anarchy, with costly repercussions for global commerce.

Robert Satloff has some harsh words for the U.S. government in this regard, words I take especially seriously because Satloff is someone inclined to political moderation. Why, he asks, have American diplomats failed to achieve anything in their endless rounds of talks in Doha and Cairo? Because

there is simply not enough pressure on Hamas to change course, accept a deal, and release the remaining October 7 hostages, stuck in nightmarish captivity. . . . In this environment, why should Hamas change course?

Publicly, the U.S. should bite the bullet and urge Israel to complete the main battle operations in Gaza—i.e., the Rafah operation—as swiftly and efficiently as possible. We should be assertively assisting with the humanitarian side of this.

Satloff had more to say about the hostages, especially the five American ones, in a speech he gave recently:

I am ashamed—ashamed of how we have allowed the story of the hostages to get lost in the noise of the war that followed their capture; ashamed of how we have permitted their release to be a bargaining chip in some larger political negotiation; ashamed of how we have failed to give them the respect and dignity and our wholehearted demand for Red Cross access and care and medicine that is our normal, usual demand for hostages.

If they were taken by Boko Haram, everyone would know their name. If they were taken by the Taliban, everyone would tie a yellow ribbon around a tree for them. If they were taken by Islamic State, kids would learn about them in school.

It is repugnant to see their freedom as just one item on the bargaining table with Hamas, as though they were chattel. These are Americans—and they deserve to be backed by the full faith and credit of the United States.