More evidence that military force deters terrorism comes from a recent statement of Hamas’s second-in-command Moussa Abu Marzouk, who recently told the Washington, DC-based news outlet Al-Monitor that his organization would consider subsuming itself under the Palestinian Authority (PA) and seeking a two-state solution. Although he can hardly be taken at his word, this sudden embrace of what Hamas has long considered anathema must be chalked up to the success of the IDF’s campaign in Gaza—which hasn’t caused Abu Marzouk to radicalize his rhetoric, but to moderate it.

This same Abu Marzouk stated in an October 23 interview that it is the responsibility of the United Nations, not Hamas, to provide for and protect Gazan civilians. This surprisingly frank admission gets to the heart of how the group has used the massive international aid—from the UN, from NGOs, and from Western and Muslim countries—that flows into the strip. Ari Heistein and Nathaniel Rabkin explain:

Over the fifteen years during which it has controlled the Gaza Strip, Hamas has honed exploitation of aid into a science. The group does not generally expropriate aid items directly, but rather uses its control of the government apparatus in Gaza to ensure that donor funds are siphoned off, either directly to Hamas or to entities it controls. For example, the strip’s private security companies are all licensed by the Hamas Ministry of Interior, and their staff must be approved and trained by the ministry. UN and other aid-group facilities therefore end up paying Hamas to guard them.

Hamas also imposes high taxes on goods in the strip, including food staples, meaning that a substantial portion of the salaries paid to local aid-agency employees winds up in Hamas’s coffers. Given the enormous role played by the UN and other international groups in Gaza, taxes paid by their employees likely account for a substantial fraction of Hamas’s revenues. . . . Hamas also tries to directly involve itself in the work of UN agencies in Gaza.

A similar strategy, write Heistein and Rabkin, is employed by another Iran-backed terrorist group, the Houthis, who have plunged Yemen into a disastrous humanitarian crisis and are now profiting from the aid meant to alleviate it. “In Syria,” Heistein and Rabkin add, “a government that operates more like a terrorist organization provides a hint of what Hamas and the Houthis could become, if they win international recognition.”

How did Qatar, an American ally, become the nerve center of the leading Palestinian jihadist organization? Natalie Ecanow explains.

When Jordan expelled Hamas in 1999, Qatar offered sanctuary to the group, which had already become notorious for using suicide-bombing attacks over the previous decade. . . . Hamas chose to relocate to Syria. However, that arrangement lasted for only a decade. With the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, the terror group found its way back to Qatar.

In 2003, Hamas leaders reportedly convened in Qatar after the IDF attempted to eliminate Hamas’s founder, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, following a Hamas suicide bombing in Jerusalem that killed seven people, including two American citizens. This episode led to one of the first efforts by Qatar to advocate for its terror proxy.

Thirteen years and five wars between Hamas and Israel later, Qatar’s support for Hamas has not waned. . . . To this day, Qatari officials maintain that the office came at the “request from Washington to establish indirect lines of communication with Hamas.” However, an Obama White House official asserted that there was never any request from Washington. . . . Inexplicably, the United States government continues to rely on Qatar to negotiate for the release of the hostages held by Hamas, even as the regime hosts the terror group’s political elite.

A reckoning is needed between our two countries. Congressional hearings, legislation, executive orders, and other measures to regulate relations between our countries are long overdue.