Last week, Hamas reportedly rejected an Egyptian plan to release hostages and relinquish power in exchange for a permanent ceasefire and Israel’s release of some Palestinian prisoners. Instead, its negotiators are hoping to secure the release of high-profile terrorists like Marwan Barghouti, one of the architects of the second intifada. Avi Issacharoff argues that Hamas’s leaders have fatally misread Israeli intentions, and their hopes of freeing Barghouti and similar figures “lack a firm grip on reality.”

The firm stance of Hamas stems from the belief that [it has] a unique opportunity to extract significant concessions from Israel in terms of the duration of the ceasefire and the identity of Palestinian prisoners to be released in exchange for the Israeli hostages. This attitude has been particularly evident since October 7, marked by assertiveness and a lack of grounding in reality.

True, many Hamas terrorists have survived [the initial Israeli invasion] and continue to launch attacks on IDF forces. While voices in Israel clamor for an immediate prisoner exchange, signs of impatience are evident regarding the realization of the ground operation’s objectives. Yet [Hamas’s top official in Gaza], Yahya Sinwar, and his cohorts have not fully grasped that the Israeli public will not accept anything less than the dismantling of Hamas’s rule in Gaza. Moreover, the Netanyahu government will not endure a long-term ceasefire without significant military achievements. Thus, whether intentionally or not, Hamas’s refusal to enter negotiations on the hostage issue before the cessation of hostilities only serves Israel’s military interests.

The IDF continues to achieve significant military gains daily. Even though it is far from a decisive victory or a collapse of Hamas, more and more of its tunnels are damaged, and more and more terrorists are killed.

While the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has never been friendly to Hamas, his government has objected strenuously to the Israeli campaign in the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip. Haisam Hassanein explains why:

Cairo has long been playing a double game, holding Hamas terrorists near while simultaneously trying to appear helpful to the United States and Israel. Israel taking control of Rafah threatens Egypt’s ability to exploit the chaos in Gaza, both to generate profits for regime insiders and so Cairo can pose as an indispensable mediator and preserve access to U.S. money and arms.

Egyptian security officials have looked the other way while Hamas and other Palestinian militants dug tunnels on the Egyptian-Gaza border. That gave Cairo the ability to use the situation in Gaza as a tool for regional influence and to ensure Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would not be eclipsed by regional competitors such as Qatar and Turkey.

Some elements close to the Sisi regime have benefited from Hamas control over Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Media reports indicate an Egyptian company run by one of Sisi’s close allies is making hundreds of millions of dollars by taxing Gazans fleeing the current conflict.

Moreover, writes Judith Miller, the Gaza war has been a godsend to the entire Egyptian economy, which was in dire straits last fall. Since October 7, the International Monetary Fund has given the country a much-needed injection of cash, since the U.S. and other Western countries believe it is a necessary intermediary and stabilizing force. Cairo therefore sees the continuation of the war, rather than an Israeli victory, as most desirable. Hassanein concludes:

Adding to its financial incentive, the Sisi regime views the Rafah crossing as a crucial card in preserving Cairo’s regional standing. Holding it increases Egypt’s relevance to countries that want to send aid to the Palestinians and ensures Washington stays quiet about Egypt’s gross human-rights violations so it can maintain a stable flow of U.S. assistance and weaponry. . . . No serious effort to turn the page on Hamas will yield the desired results without cutting this umbilical cord between the Sisi regime and Hamas.