Yoel Guzansky and Ilan Zalayat explain why Jerusalem has been willing to deal with Hamas’s sponsors in Doha until now:

Israel’s Qatari dilemma is thus: although the connection between Qatar and Hamas harms Israeli interests, at the same time, thanks to its ties with the organization, Qatar has served, and continues to serve, other Israeli interests.

The Qatari transfer of money to Hamas was welcomed by Israel, which was beguiled by the false quiet that it bought. . . . Israel hoped that these funds would encourage Hamas to maintain the security calm. . . . The Qatari envoy to Gaza, Mohammed al-Emadi, was seen by Israel as a convenient channel for relaying messages to Hamas.

Now that this approach appears to have failed, what should Israel do?

Given that the most effective way to apply pressure on Qatar is through the United States, Israel should appeal to the Biden administration to pressure the Qatari regime to change its policy. For example, Israel should ensure, in part by appealing to Washington, that the presence of Hamas leaders in Qatar becomes a burden for Doha. However, since Washington sees Qatar as an asset, Israel should lower its expectations—even when it comes to the American promise that it has agreed with Doha that the Qataris will “reexamine” their ties with Hamas after the war.

Consequently, any change in Israeli policy toward Qatar—for example, by trying to assassinate senior Hamas figures who have been given refuge in Qatar—could encounter stiff U.S. opposition, especially in the short term.

Far better than Doha’s expulsion of Hamas’s seniormost leaders, who will inevitably find refuge elsewhere, and better even than their assassination by the Mossad, would be if Qatar arrests them and hands them over to the U.S., sending a clear message that the game is up for the terrorist group.

On Tuesday, representatives of Hamas met with their counterparts from Fatah—the faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) once led by Yasir Arafat that now governs parts of the West Bank—in Beijing to discuss possible reconciliation. While it is unlikely that these talks will yield any more progress than the many previous rounds, they constitute a significant step in China’s increasing attempts to involve itself in the Middle East on the side of Israel’s enemies.

By contrast, writes Tuvia Gering, Taiwan has been quick and consistent in its condemnations of Hamas and Iran and its expressions of sympathy with Israel:

Support from Taipei goes beyond words. Taiwan’s appointee in Tel Aviv and de-facto ambassador, Abby Lee, has been busy aiding hostage families, adopting the most affected kibbutzim in southern Israel, and volunteering with farmers. Taiwan recently pledged more than half a million dollars to Israel for critical initiatives, including medical and communications supplies for local municipalities. This follows earlier aid from Taiwan to an organization helping Israeli soldiers and families immediately after the October 7 attack.

The reasons why are not hard to fathom:

In many ways, Taiwan sees a reflection of itself in Israel—two vibrant democracies facing threats from hostile neighbors. Both nations wield substantial economic and technological prowess, and both heavily depend on U.S. military exports and diplomacy. Taipei also sees Israel as a “role model” for what Taiwan should aspire to be, citing its unwavering determination and capabilities to defend itself.

On a deeper level, Taiwanese leaders seem to view Israel’s war with Hamas and Iran as an extension of a greater struggle between democracy and autocracy.

Gering urges Israel to reciprocate these expressions of friendship and to take into account that “China has been going above and beyond to demonize the Jewish state in international forums.” Above all, he writes, Jerusalem should “take a firmer stance against China’s support for Hamas and Iran-backed terrorism, exposing the hypocrisy and repression that underpin its vision for a new global order.”