Yoel Guzansky and Ilan Zalayat explain why Jerusalem has been willing to deal with Hamas’s sponsors in Doha until now:

Israel’s Qatari dilemma is thus: although the connection between Qatar and Hamas harms Israeli interests, at the same time, thanks to its ties with the organization, Qatar has served, and continues to serve, other Israeli interests.

The Qatari transfer of money to Hamas was welcomed by Israel, which was beguiled by the false quiet that it bought. . . . Israel hoped that these funds would encourage Hamas to maintain the security calm. . . . The Qatari envoy to Gaza, Mohammed al-Emadi, was seen by Israel as a convenient channel for relaying messages to Hamas.

Now that this approach appears to have failed, what should Israel do?

Given that the most effective way to apply pressure on Qatar is through the United States, Israel should appeal to the Biden administration to pressure the Qatari regime to change its policy. For example, Israel should ensure, in part by appealing to Washington, that the presence of Hamas leaders in Qatar becomes a burden for Doha. However, since Washington sees Qatar as an asset, Israel should lower its expectations—even when it comes to the American promise that it has agreed with Doha that the Qataris will “reexamine” their ties with Hamas after the war.

Consequently, any change in Israeli policy toward Qatar—for example, by trying to assassinate senior Hamas figures who have been given refuge in Qatar—could encounter stiff U.S. opposition, especially in the short term.

Far better than Doha’s expulsion of Hamas’s seniormost leaders, who will inevitably find refuge elsewhere, and better even than their assassination by the Mossad, would be if Qatar arrests them and hands them over to the U.S., sending a clear message that the game is up for the terrorist group.

Ron Ben-Yishai, reporting from a visit to IDF forces in the Gaza Strip, analyzes the state of the fighting, and “the persistent challenge of eradicating an entrenched enemy in a complex urban terrain.”

Hamas, sensing the war’s end, is mounting a final effort to inflict casualties. The IDF now controls 65 percent of Gaza’s territory operationally, with observation, fire dominance, and relative freedom of movement, alongside systematic tunnel destruction. . . . Major P, a reserve company commander, says, “It’s frustrating to hear at home that we’re stagnating. The public doesn’t get that if we stop, Hamas will recover.”

Senior IDF officers cite two reasons for the slow progress: meticulous care to protect hostages, requiring cautious movement and constant intelligence gathering, and avoiding heavy losses, with 22 soldiers killed since June.

Two-and-a-half of Hamas’s five brigades have been dismantled, yet a new hostage deal and IDF withdrawal could allow Hamas to regroup. . . . Hamas is at its lowest military and governing point since its founding, reduced to a fragmented guerrilla force. Yet, without complete disarmament and infrastructure destruction, it could resurge as a threat in years.

At the same time, Ben-Yishai observes, not everything hangs on the IDF:

According to the Southern Command chief Major General Yaron Finkelman, the IDF is close to completing its objectives. In classical military terms, “defeat” means the enemy surrenders—but with a jihadist organization, the benchmark is its ability to operate against Israel.

Despite [the IDF’s] battlefield successes, the broader strategic outcome—especially regarding the hostages—now hinges on decisions from the political leadership. “We’ve done our part,” said a senior officer. “We’ve reached a crossroads where the government must decide where it wants to go—both on the hostage issue and on Gaza’s future.”