In the past few weeks, there have been numerous reports in Western media of a wave of “settler violence” committed against Palestinians in the West Bank. The phenomenon has led to condemnations from the French and U.S. governments, reports from the UN and various hostile NGOs, and a casual determination by the Guardian—a widely read and viciously anti-Israel publication—that what is happening amounts to “ethnic cleansing.” But the facts paint a very different picture. David M. Weinberg explains, drawing on statistics compiled by the Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security agency:

Overall, the level of violence in 2023 is about the same as that of 2022, totaling about 1,000 incidences of violence of all types over the course of the full year. “Violence” in this context means many different things, from verbal altercations and rock throwing (what the Shin Bet calls “frictions” or “harassment”), to spray-painting of anti-Arab slogans and other undercover vandalism including agricultural vandalism (“price-tag activities”), to firebombing of homes or mosques (which are classified as outright “terrorist strikes”).

In fact, the more serious type of incidents dropped by 50 percent as compared to last year (although the handful of incidents that did take place this year were of a more violent nature), and there were zero incidents of “terrorist strikes” over the past 60 days. There is no evidence whatsoever of the wild accusation [by the Israel-based human-rights group B’Tselem] that “600 Palestinians from thirteen communities were forced to abandon their homes” due to fear of settler attacks.

It is unfortunately true that altercations and aggressions by settlers in 2022 (again, not 2023) rose sharply over those in 2020 and 2021. . . . This is unacceptable, and I hold no wellsprings of sympathy for the hilltop wild men involved. Israel must aggressively combat this lawlessness while acting even more aggressively against exponentially greater and more deadly Palestinian terrorism. But has there been an enormous, out-of-control surge in settler violence recently? No.

Ron Ben-Yishai, reporting from a visit to IDF forces in the Gaza Strip, analyzes the state of the fighting, and “the persistent challenge of eradicating an entrenched enemy in a complex urban terrain.”

Hamas, sensing the war’s end, is mounting a final effort to inflict casualties. The IDF now controls 65 percent of Gaza’s territory operationally, with observation, fire dominance, and relative freedom of movement, alongside systematic tunnel destruction. . . . Major P, a reserve company commander, says, “It’s frustrating to hear at home that we’re stagnating. The public doesn’t get that if we stop, Hamas will recover.”

Senior IDF officers cite two reasons for the slow progress: meticulous care to protect hostages, requiring cautious movement and constant intelligence gathering, and avoiding heavy losses, with 22 soldiers killed since June.

Two-and-a-half of Hamas’s five brigades have been dismantled, yet a new hostage deal and IDF withdrawal could allow Hamas to regroup. . . . Hamas is at its lowest military and governing point since its founding, reduced to a fragmented guerrilla force. Yet, without complete disarmament and infrastructure destruction, it could resurge as a threat in years.

At the same time, Ben-Yishai observes, not everything hangs on the IDF:

According to the Southern Command chief Major General Yaron Finkelman, the IDF is close to completing its objectives. In classical military terms, “defeat” means the enemy surrenders—but with a jihadist organization, the benchmark is its ability to operate against Israel.

Despite [the IDF’s] battlefield successes, the broader strategic outcome—especially regarding the hostages—now hinges on decisions from the political leadership. “We’ve done our part,” said a senior officer. “We’ve reached a crossroads where the government must decide where it wants to go—both on the hostage issue and on Gaza’s future.”