In airstrikes near Damascus on Monday, the IDF reportedly killed the Iranian brigadier general Razi Mousavi. Jerusalem, per its usual policy, did not take credit for the attack, and on its surface it looked a lot like hundreds of other pinpointed strikes against Tehran-linked targets in Syria since 2011. But in the context of the Gaza war, and escalation on the Lebanese border and in the Red Sea, Yoav Limor sees the killing of Mousavi as a clear message to the Islamic Republic.

Israel and Iran have been fighting each other in various ways for almost three decades. Until the events of October 7, Iran bled much more than Israel in every possible arena. Hamas’s attack and the regional conflict that developed in its wake changed the picture. Today it is Israel that is bleeding—among other things, due to overt encouragement and assistance from Iran—while Iran itself pays a negligible price on its own soil.

It is likely that Monday’s assassination, which Iran attributes to Israel, was meant to send Tehran the message that Israel’s patience is running out. It is not certain that the message was fully received; in fact, the strike may lead Iran to ramp up its activity and also to try to exact a price from Israelis and Jews worldwide. This is a constant Iranian effort taking place across dozens of locations worldwide, which has so far been thwarted thanks to impressive activity by the Mossad and various security services.

Therefore, it seems Israel will soon need to have a real discussion [about] whether to strike Iran openly on its territory. This is a complex decision with costs in every possible aspect—security, political, economic, and regional—but it also has real potential to deter Tehran, or at least cause it to deal more with defense and less with offense.

While the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has never been friendly to Hamas, his government has objected strenuously to the Israeli campaign in the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip. Haisam Hassanein explains why:

Cairo has long been playing a double game, holding Hamas terrorists near while simultaneously trying to appear helpful to the United States and Israel. Israel taking control of Rafah threatens Egypt’s ability to exploit the chaos in Gaza, both to generate profits for regime insiders and so Cairo can pose as an indispensable mediator and preserve access to U.S. money and arms.

Egyptian security officials have looked the other way while Hamas and other Palestinian militants dug tunnels on the Egyptian-Gaza border. That gave Cairo the ability to use the situation in Gaza as a tool for regional influence and to ensure Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would not be eclipsed by regional competitors such as Qatar and Turkey.

Some elements close to the Sisi regime have benefited from Hamas control over Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Media reports indicate an Egyptian company run by one of Sisi’s close allies is making hundreds of millions of dollars by taxing Gazans fleeing the current conflict.

Moreover, writes Judith Miller, the Gaza war has been a godsend to the entire Egyptian economy, which was in dire straits last fall. Since October 7, the International Monetary Fund has given the country a much-needed injection of cash, since the U.S. and other Western countries believe it is a necessary intermediary and stabilizing force. Cairo therefore sees the continuation of the war, rather than an Israeli victory, as most desirable. Hassanein concludes:

Adding to its financial incentive, the Sisi regime views the Rafah crossing as a crucial card in preserving Cairo’s regional standing. Holding it increases Egypt’s relevance to countries that want to send aid to the Palestinians and ensures Washington stays quiet about Egypt’s gross human-rights violations so it can maintain a stable flow of U.S. assistance and weaponry. . . . No serious effort to turn the page on Hamas will yield the desired results without cutting this umbilical cord between the Sisi regime and Hamas.