For the Jewish state to prevail, it must not only achieve tactical successes on the battlefield, but also think clearly about its strategic aims and how to fulfill them. To do so, it must in turn grasp Hamas’s goals, and ensure that they remain unmet. It is not enough to judge Hamas as “irrational,” as many in the West are content to do. Amiad Cohen presents a more sophisticated analysis:

Hamas’s objective wasn’t merely the destruction of Israel, but rather . . .  to embarrass it and gain strategic leverage. Hamas sought to emerge from the conflict as Israel’s primary adversary, surpassing even Hizballah, aiming for significant post-conflict gains like lifting the blockade [on Gaza], establishing maritime ports and airports, and possibly even securing UN recognition. Instead, this strategy backfired. . . .

The overarching consensus that is emerging across the [Israeli] political spectrum is that the key to [having a decisive effect on] our Palestinian adversaries lies in inflicting a strong blow to their inherent sense of honor. Military victories must be converted into palpable psychological setbacks. The manifestation of such a defeat could range from a “humbling” surrender . . . to the reestablishment of Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip. The specific strategy may still be up for debate, but the core principle remains; without Palestinian acceptance of its unequivocal defeat, a sustainable political resolution that meets Israel’s security requirements is unattainable.

Engaging in negotiations with Hamas amidst ongoing conflict might be inevitable, but Israel needs to approach these talks with utmost caution. The primary diplomatic objective should be clear: decisively dismantling Hamas in a manner that imprints a sense of overwhelming defeat on the Palestinian psyche. Such a strategy is pivotal to achieving the long-sought political milestone of reestablishing a sense of security for the citizens of Israel, while hopefully cautioning against future attacks.

While the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has never been friendly to Hamas, his government has objected strenuously to the Israeli campaign in the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip. Haisam Hassanein explains why:

Cairo has long been playing a double game, holding Hamas terrorists near while simultaneously trying to appear helpful to the United States and Israel. Israel taking control of Rafah threatens Egypt’s ability to exploit the chaos in Gaza, both to generate profits for regime insiders and so Cairo can pose as an indispensable mediator and preserve access to U.S. money and arms.

Egyptian security officials have looked the other way while Hamas and other Palestinian militants dug tunnels on the Egyptian-Gaza border. That gave Cairo the ability to use the situation in Gaza as a tool for regional influence and to ensure Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would not be eclipsed by regional competitors such as Qatar and Turkey.

Some elements close to the Sisi regime have benefited from Hamas control over Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Media reports indicate an Egyptian company run by one of Sisi’s close allies is making hundreds of millions of dollars by taxing Gazans fleeing the current conflict.

Moreover, writes Judith Miller, the Gaza war has been a godsend to the entire Egyptian economy, which was in dire straits last fall. Since October 7, the International Monetary Fund has given the country a much-needed injection of cash, since the U.S. and other Western countries believe it is a necessary intermediary and stabilizing force. Cairo therefore sees the continuation of the war, rather than an Israeli victory, as most desirable. Hassanein concludes:

Adding to its financial incentive, the Sisi regime views the Rafah crossing as a crucial card in preserving Cairo’s regional standing. Holding it increases Egypt’s relevance to countries that want to send aid to the Palestinians and ensures Washington stays quiet about Egypt’s gross human-rights violations so it can maintain a stable flow of U.S. assistance and weaponry. . . . No serious effort to turn the page on Hamas will yield the desired results without cutting this umbilical cord between the Sisi regime and Hamas.