The Abraham Accords Aren’t Dead, and Peace with Saudi Arabia Remains on the Table

Jan. 18 2024

Last week, Secretary of State Antony Blinken—fresh from a meeting with the Saudi crown prince—was asked about the possibility of normalization between Riyadh and Jerusalem, and responded that there remains a “clear interest” in the prospect. There is no reason to believe that he was engaged in wishful thinking. John Allen Gay observes that, since October 7, “the Abraham Accords states and their near-partner Saudi Arabia have not retreated from their stance on Israel, but are digging in to defend it.”

The Israelis and the conservative monarchies share three fears. First, they fear Iran and its network of proxies and partners around the region. Second, they fear Islamist agitation in the region—not only violent jihadism, but also brands of Islamism that give jihadism running room or that threaten to change the regional order. Third, they fear that the United States will abandon them or drift toward neutrality in their rivalry with Iran. The Abraham Accords, for them, respond to all three challenges by deepening ties in a U.S.-backed, anti-Islamist, anti-Iranian partnership.

Read more at Providence

More about: Abraham Accords, Israel diplomacy, Saudi Arabia

Egypt Is Trapped by the Gaza Dilemma It Helped to Create

Feb. 14 2025

Recent satellite imagery has shown a buildup of Egyptian tanks near the Israeli border, in violation of Egypt-Israel agreements going back to the 1970s. It’s possible Cairo wants to prevent Palestinians from entering the Sinai from Gaza, or perhaps it wants to send a message to the U.S. that it will take all measures necessary to keep that from happening. But there is also a chance, however small, that it could be preparing for something more dangerous. David Wurmser examines President Abdel Fatah el-Sisi’s predicament:

Egypt’s abysmal behavior in allowing its common border with Gaza to be used for the dangerous smuggling of weapons, money, and materiel to Hamas built the problem that exploded on October 7. Hamas could arm only to the level that Egypt enabled it. Once exposed, rather than help Israel fix the problem it enabled, Egypt manufactured tensions with Israel to divert attention from its own culpability.

Now that the Trump administration is threatening to remove the population of Gaza, President Sisi is reaping the consequences of a problem he and his predecessors helped to sow. That, writes Wurmser, leaves him with a dilemma:

On one hand, Egypt fears for its regime’s survival if it accepts Trump’s plan. It would position Cairo as a participant in a second disaster, or nakba. It knows from its own history; King Farouk was overthrown in 1952 in part for his failure to prevent the first nakba in 1948. Any leader who fails to stop a second nakba, let alone participates in it, risks losing legitimacy and being seen as weak. The perception of buckling on the Palestine issue also resulted in the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat’s assassination in 1981. President Sisi risks being seen by his own population as too weak to stand up to Israel or the United States, as not upholding his manliness.

In a worst-case scenario, Wurmser argues, Sisi might decide that he’d rather fight a disastrous war with Israel and blow up his relationship with Washington than display that kind of weakness.

Read more at The Editors

More about: Egypt, Gaza War 2023