Last week, Hizballah fired a rocket at a church in northern Israel, injuring an elderly Christian civilian. The terrorists then fired another as soldiers rushed to the rescue, injuring nine of them. Bassam Tawil compares the way church leaders have responded to this incident to the condemnations—including from the pope—following the deaths of two Palestinian Christians in Gaza, even though no evidence emerged to back up the accusation that the IDF was responsible.

As of this writing, no Christian leader had anything to say about Hizballah’s missile attack on a church. . . . Where were the pope and other Christian organizations, one wonders, when Christians living under the terrorist group Hamas, an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, were being systematically targeted and persecuted?

During the volatile period of 2006–2008 in the Gaza Strip, Islamist terrorists murdered Rami Ayyad, a Palestinian Christian activist who served as manager of the only Christian bookstore there. The bookstore had been the target of several attacks in the past, including bombings and arson. Ayyad was known to have received death threats over the years.

Christian leaders who turn their backs on the plight of the Christians in the Gaza Strip, or anywhere, while continuing to be obsessed with Israel are doing immense harm to their flocks: away from the public’s attention, Christians will be targeted more fiercely than ever. Worse, those who are ignoring the attacks on Christians are giving a green light to Hamas, Hizballah, and other Islamists to destroy Christian holy sites and murder Christians.

Small in area and population and rich in natural gas, Qatar plays an outsize role in the Middle East. While its support keeps Hamas in business, it also has vital relations with Israel that are much better than those enjoyed by many other Arab countries. Doha’s relationship with Washington, though more complex, isn’t so different. Yoel Guzansky offers a comprehensive examination of Israel’s Qatar dilemma:

At first glance, Qatar’s foreign policy seems filled with contradictions. Since 1995, it has pursued a strategy of diplomatic hedging—building relationships with multiple, often competing, actors. Qatar’s vast wealth and close ties with the United States have enabled it to maneuver independently on the international stage, maintaining relations with rival factions, including those that are direct adversaries.

Qatar plays an active role in international diplomacy, engaging in conflict mediation in over twenty regions worldwide. While not all of its mediation efforts have been successful, they have helped boost its international prestige, which it considers vital for its survival among larger and more powerful neighbors. Qatar has participated in mediation efforts in Venezuela, Lebanon, Iran, Afghanistan, and other conflict zones, reinforcing its image as a neutral broker.

Israel’s stated objective of removing Hamas from power in Gaza is fundamentally at odds with Qatar’s interest in keeping Hamas as the governing force. In theory, if the Israeli hostages would to be released, Israel could break free from its dependence on Qatari mediation. However, it is likely that even after such a development, Qatar will continue positioning itself as a mediator—particularly in enforcing agreements and shaping Gaza’s reconstruction efforts.

Qatar’s position is strengthened further by its good relations with the U.S. Yet, Guzansky notes, it has weaknesses as well that Israel could exploit:

Qatar is highly sensitive to its global image and prides itself on maintaining a neutral diplomatic posture. If Israel chooses to undermine Qatar’s reputation, it could target specific aspects of Qatari activity that are problematic from an Israeli perspective.