Many Israeli and American political commentators seem to believe that the Biden administration’s support for Israel following October 7 risks alienating the Democratic party’s progressive base. There is little doubt that a vocal segment of the American far left is incensed with the White House over the issue. But does this slice of the population hold anything akin to electoral clout? Seth Mandel doesn’t think so, notwithstanding the fact that a congressman told a journalist off the record that the Israel-Hamas war “is a disaster politically.”

Plenty of polling shows a segment of the Democratic party to be unhappy with Biden’s handling of the war, but those surveys do not suggest that turning on Israel would make sense from an electoral standpoint. . . . Additionally, support for the Palestinians has dropped three points among respondents ages eighteen to thirty-four, precisely the demographic supposedly ready to toss Biden overboard over Gaza.

Lastly, many of those who disapprove of Biden’s handling of the war believe he ought to support Israel even more strongly. Gallup found about 40 percent thought that what the U.S. has done so far to back Israel in the war is “not enough.”

Biden isn’t endangering his reelection by supporting Israel. Instead, members of his party appear to wish the president was in more trouble than he is.

Robert Clark explains why the resumption of hostilities is both just and necessary:

These latest Israeli strikes come after weeks of consistent Palestinian provocation; they have repeatedly broken the terms of the cease-fire which they claimed they were so desperate for. There have been numerous [unsuccessful] bus bombings near Tel Aviv and Palestinian-instigated clashes in the West Bank. Fifty-nine Israeli hostages are still held in captivity.

In fact, Hamas and their Palestinian supporters . . . have always known that they can sit back, parade dead Israeli hostages live on social media, and receive hundreds of their own convicted terrorists and murderers back in return. They believed they could get away with the October 7 pogrom.

One hopes Hamas’s leaders will get the message. Meanwhile, many inside and outside Israel seem to believe that, by resuming the fighting, Jerusalem has given up on rescuing the remaining hostages. But, writes Ron Ben-Yishai, this assertion misunderstands the goals of the present campaign. “Experience within the IDF and Israeli intelligence,” Ben-Yishai writes, “has shown that such pressure is the most effective way to push Hamas toward flexibility.” He outlines two other aims:

The second objective was to signal to Hamas that Israel is not only targeting its military wing—the terror army that was the focus of previous phases of the war up until the last cease-fire—but also its governance structure. This was demonstrated by the targeted elimination of five senior officials from Hamas’s political and civilian administration. . . . The strikes also served as a message to mediators, particularly Egypt, that Israel opposes Hamas remaining in any governing or military capacity in post-war Gaza.

The third objective was to create intense military pressure, coordinated with the U.S., on all remaining elements of the Shiite “axis of resistance,” including Yemen’s Houthis, Hamas, and Iran.