The only thing that might stop the IDF from taking Rafah, short of Hamas’s surrender, would be U.S. pressure for a temporary ceasefire. Recently American officials have begun speaking of just that, a shift from the “humanitarian pause” that has until now been the key diplomatic buzzword. The U.S. has even circulated a draft ceasefire resolution at the UN.

Noah Rothman believes such moves are intended to appeal to the Democrats’ progressive, anti-Israel wing, and even more so to Arab-American voters in Michigan. In his view this isn’t just morally and strategically incoherent, but also bad politics:

Though it reads like an act of statecraft, the resolution is intended for the consumption of Biden’s monomaniacally anti-Israel domestic critics. Little else explains the administration’s willingness to sacrifice U.S. national interests but its political investment in self-preservation.

Because none of this makes any sense absent a consideration of the domestic political pressures a wildly unrepresentative class of activists are putting on this presidency, we must conclude that Biden has prioritized his reelection prospects over America’s permanent interests. If the Biden campaign genuinely believes its success hinges on a small number of malcontents in Michigan, it is in deep trouble well beyond the state’s borders. Biden would be better served appealing to the majority of Americans for whom Israel’s cause is a vital extension of American grand strategy abroad. At the very least, his administration would go down without putting American national interests on the chopping block in a cloying effort to appease the unappeasable.

Since the war began, there has been a tension between Israel’s two primary goals: the destruction of Hamas and the liberation of the hostages. Many see in Israel’s renewed campaign in Gaza a sacrifice of the latter goal in pursuit of the former. But Meir Ben-Shabbat suggests that Israel’s attacks aim to bring Hamas back to the negotiating table:

The timing of the attack, its intensity, and the extent of casualties surprised Hamas. Its senior leaders are likely still wondering whether this is a limited action meant to shock and send a message or the beginning of a sustained operation. The statement by its senior officials linking the renewal of fighting to the fate of the hostages hints at the way it may act to stop Israel. This threat requires the Israeli political leadership to formulate a series of draconian measures and declare that they will be carried out if Hamas harms the hostages.

Ostensibly, Israel’s interest in receiving the hostages and continuing the fighting stands in complete contradiction to that of Hamas, but in practice Hamas has flexibility that has not yet been exhausted. This stems from the large number of hostages in its possession, which allows it to realize additional deals for some of them, and this is what Israel has been aiming its efforts toward.

We must concede that the challenge Israel faces is not simple, but the alternative Hamas presents—surrendering to its dictates and leaving it as the central power factor in Gaza—limits its options. . . . Tightening and significantly hardening the blockade along with increasing pressure through airstrikes, evacuating areas and capturing them, may force Hamas to make its stance more flexible.

But Ben-Shabbat also acknowledges the danger in this approach. The war’s renewal puts the hostages in greater danger. And as Israel makes threats, it will be obliged to carry them out.