After World War II, both Israel and South Korea emerged as small, economically backward, newly created states with long histories threatened by large and powerful neighbors who sought their destruction. Since then, both have become advanced democracies with thriving economies, as well as important U.S. allies, even though the threats to their security have remained. They also share a common enemy in North Korea. Efraim Inbar and Jakob Rheins examine these similarities and how they shape relations between the two countries.

While Israel and South Korea are strong military powers, both tried to solve their ongoing regional conflicts peacefully at the end of the last century. Israel tried via the Oslo process, while South Korea practiced the Sunshine Policy toward North Korea. Interestingly, Israel, under Yitzhak Rabin, even tried to change North Korean behavior in the Middle East. These attempts failed. Israel and South Korea remained aware that they must have the military capabilities to deal with their respective conflicts should they intensify.

In 2014, South Korea’s former ambassador to Israel, Lee Gun-Tae, told the visiting Israeli president Reuven Rivlin: “South Korea is probably the only country that can understand Israel’s complicated situation.” Rivlin replied: “Until I came to Seoul, I thought there was only one miracle, Israel, and then I saw what you have done since the 1950s.” Rivlin was the first Israeli president to visit South Korea. He expressed his hope for closer cooperation and bilateral tourism. Indeed, nearly ten years later, the two countries are more intimate than ever.

Interestingly, what also brings the two countries together is the keen South Korean interest in Talmud study. There is widespread appreciation of Jewish intellectual achievements and Talmud—a fundamental Jewish text—has become a popular subject of study and a part of the curriculum in the South Korean education system.

With the IDF engaged in ground maneuvers in both northern and southern Gaza, and a plan about to go into effect next week that would separate more than 100,000 civilians from Hamas’s control, an end to the war may at last be in sight. Yet there seems to be no agreement within Israel, or without, about what should become of the territory. Efraim Inbar assesses the various proposals, from Donald Trump’s plan to remove the population entirely, to the Israeli far-right’s desire to settle the Strip with Jews, to the internationally supported proposal to place Gaza under the control of the Palestinian Authority (PA)—and exposes the fatal flaws of each. He therefore tries to reframe the problem:

[M]any Arab states have failed to establish a monopoly on the use of force within their borders. Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and Sudan all suffer from civil wars or armed militias that do not obey the central government.

Perhaps Israel needs to get used to the idea that in the absence of an entity willing to take Gaza under its wing, chaos will prevail there. This is less terrible than people may think. Chaos would allow Israel to establish buffer zones along the Gaza border without interference. Any entity controlling Gaza would oppose such measures and would resist necessary Israeli measures to reduce terrorism. Chaos may also encourage emigration.

Israel is doomed to live with bad neighbors for the foreseeable future. There is no way to ensure zero terrorism. Israel should avoid adopting a policy of containment and should constantly “mow the grass” to minimize the chances of a major threat emerging across the border. Periodic conflicts may be necessary. If the Jews want a state in their homeland, they need to internalize that Israel will have to live by the sword for many more years.