Glazer wasn’t the only prominent Jewish figure who used a public platform to express moral confusion about Israel this week. While Chuck Schumer’s speech in the Senate yesterday was less egregious, his status as a senior Democratic legislator with a reputation for being pro-Israel makes it more concerning. In that speech, Schumer condemned Benjamin Netanyahu as an “obstacle to peace,” and declared that his coalition “no longer fits the needs of Israel after October 7.” Schumer seems unaware that Benny Gantz, Netanyahu’s most popular political rival, joined that coalition when the war began. Elliott Abrams comments on this “unprecedented and indefensible” criticism of a democratic ally:

Schumer seems deeply confused about what Israelis want. Prime Minister Netanyahu is very unpopular and may well lose the next election—or be tossed out sooner if he loses his majority in the Knesset. But his unpopularity is tied to accusations of corruption and last year’s judicial reform battle, not to “peace.” In fact, the Israeli populace supports the actions of the current war cabinet.

Israelis are notoriously outspoken and have a vibrant democracy. In the middle of a war the very last thing they need is for a Democratic party politician to elevate his own party’s electoral needs over Israeli national security and over Israeli democracy. This speech . . . appears to signal a continuing campaign against Netanyahu. It’s a shameful and unprecedented way to treat an ally, and an unconscionable interference in the internal politics of another democracy.

A few hours after giving the speech, Schumer tentatively walked it back, posting on X that “As a democracy, Israel has the right to choose its own leaders. But the important thing is that Israelis are given a choice.”

Critics of the American bombing raid on Iran have warned that it could lead to dangerous retaliation, and risk dragging the U.S. into a broader conflict. (How this could be a greater risk than allowing the murderous fanatics who govern Iran to have nuclear weapons is a separate question.) Yesterday, Iran indeed retaliated. Noah Rothman writes:

On Monday, Iranian state media released a high-production-value video revealing [the government’s] intention to strike U.S. forces inside neighboring Qatar. A bombastic statement from Iran’s Supreme National Security Council accompanying the video claimed that Iran had launched a salvo of ten missiles at the U.S.-manned Al Udeid Air Base, which “pulverized” American forces. In reality, the missiles seem to have all been intercepted before they reached their targets. No casualties have been reported.

In fact, the Iranians quietly gave Qatar—the Gulf state with which they have the best relations—advance warning of the attack, knowing that the Qataris would then pass it on to the U.S. Thus prepared, American forces were able to minimize the damage. Rothman continues:

So far, Iran’s retaliatory response to U.S. strikes on its nuclear program looks a lot like its reaction to the 2020 attack that killed the Revolutionary Guard commander Qassem Suleimani—which is to say that it seems like Tehran is seeking an offramp to avoid a potentially existential conflict with the United States.

Now, it’s important to note that this is only a face-saving climb-down if that’s how we want to interpret it. The only reason why we remember the Iranian operation aimed at avenging Soleimani’s death as a cease-fire overture is because we decided to take it that way. We didn’t have to do that. One-hundred-and-ten U.S. service personnel were treated for injuries as a result of that direct and unprecedented ballistic-missile attack on U.S. forces in Iraq. . . . The U.S. could have regarded that strike as an unacceptable precedent, but the Trump administration had made its point. By simply deeming deterrence to have been restored, the U.S. helped bring that condition about.

It appears that is precisely what the U.S. has done this time. Last night both Washington and Tehran announced a cease-fire, one that includes Israel. Whether it will hold remains to be seen; Iran already managed to get in a deadly, eleventh-hour attack on civilians in Beersheba. If Jerusalem knew such an arrangement was in the cards—and there is every reason to think it did—then its military activities over the past few days start to make a great deal of sense.

Since June 13, there has been some lack of clarity about whether Israel’s goal is to destroy Iran’s nuclear and ballistic-missile capabilities, or to destabilize the regime. Now it seems that the IDF has been doing precisely what it has done in the final phase of almost every prior war: try to inflict as much damage as possible upon the enemy’s military infrastructure before the U.S. blows the whistle and declares the war over—thus reestablishing deterrence and leaving its enemy’s offensive capabilities severely weakened.

In the next item, I’ll turn to some of the nonmilitary targets Israel chose.