On Tuesday, the Israeli news outlet Ynet reported that the IDF plans to phase out the American-made rifles used by many of its soldiers and replace them with a domestically produced standard-issue firearm. Israel will also begin manufacturing its own one-ton bombs, and its factories will soon be churning out about 1 million rounds of ammunition each day. The Jewish state will as a result become less dependent on the U.S., and thus less susceptible to American attempts at coercion. But Washington too will benefit from this shift, as Sean Durns explains:

The United States is facing a munitions crisis. America’s defense industrial base is a shadow of its former self, and conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine have fed growing concerns about a rapidly depleting stockpile. . . . The risk is clear: were a major war to break out with China, the U.S. might well run out of munitions within the first few weeks of combat operations. Wars in Europe and the Middle East have already put pressure on an already stressed defense industrial base. And policymakers have taken notice.

Various factors have contributed to the munitions shortage: bureaucratic red tape, a decline in the number of prime contractors, and a budget and appropriations process that discourages upfront investments that are necessary to strengthen the defense industrial base. It is a problem that won’t be fixed overnight.

By having key allies step up and take on more of the defense burden, Washington will be able to focus on growing threats in the Indo-Pacific.

Concluded in 1979, the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty ended nearly 30 years of intermittent warfare, and proved one of the most enduring and beneficial products of Middle East diplomacy. But Egypt may not have been upholding its end of the bargain, write Jonathan Schanzer and Mariam Wahba:

Article III, subsection two of the peace agreement’s preamble explicitly requires both parties “to ensure that that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate from and are not committed from within its territory.” This clause also mandates both parties to hold accountable any perpetrators of such acts.

Recent Israeli operations along the Philadelphi Corridor, the narrow strip of land bordering Egypt and Gaza, have uncovered multiple tunnels and access points used by Hamas—some in plain sight of Egyptian guard towers. While it could be argued that Egypt has lacked the capacity to tackle this problem, it is equally plausible that it lacks the will. Either way, it’s a serious problem.

Was Egypt motivated by money, amidst a steep and protracted economic decline in recent years? Did Cairo get paid off by Hamas, or its wealthy patron, Qatar? Did the Iranians play a role? Was Egypt threatened with violence and unrest by the Sinai’s Bedouin Union of Tribes, who are the primary profiteers of smuggling, if it did not allow the tunnels to operate? Or did the Sisi regime take part in this operation because of an ideological hatred of Israel?