Why America Can’t Get Its Gulf Allies to Join the Fight against Iran

In 2021, the U.S. removed Yemen’s Houthi rebels from its official list of foreign terrorist groups, and ceased helping the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia in their war against the rebels. Now that these Iran-backed guerrillas are attacking international shipping, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh are reluctant to help Washington fight them. Israel, meanwhile, admitted last week that a cruise missile fired by the Houthis had successfully penetrated its air defenses and landed near Eilat. Hussain Abdul-Hussain comments:

Under the Biden administration’s strategy of “regional integration,” America’s Arab allies—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt—are members of Combined Task Force (CTF) 153, whose mission is to guarantee the security of the Red and the Arabian seas. Yet when Yemen’s Houthi forces started targeting ships, these Arab countries passed on Washington’s invitation [to take part in defending them]. Some believe this was because Riyadh and Abu Dhabi correctly calculated that Biden might change course midway and quit, leaving them facing renewed animosity from Tehran and the Houthis.

With [the U.S. envoy Bret] McGurk’s reported meeting to ask the Iranians to rein in the Houthis, the Saudis and the Emiratis were proven right. They likely see this as evidence that Biden is an unreliable ally, and that if he thinks that diplomacy is the way forward, Saudi Arabia and the UAE can reach out to Iran, and its proxies, on their own. Consistency is key to successful foreign policy. The Biden administration has not shown this.

Read more at Algemeiner

More about: Iran, Saudi Arabia, U.S. Foreign policy, United Arab Emirates, Yemen

 

Why Taiwan Stands with Israel

On Tuesday, representatives of Hamas met with their counterparts from Fatah—the faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) once led by Yasir Arafat that now governs parts of the West Bank—in Beijing to discuss possible reconciliation. While it is unlikely that these talks will yield any more progress than the many previous rounds, they constitute a significant step in China’s increasing attempts to involve itself in the Middle East on the side of Israel’s enemies.

By contrast, writes Tuvia Gering, Taiwan has been quick and consistent in its condemnations of Hamas and Iran and its expressions of sympathy with Israel:

Support from Taipei goes beyond words. Taiwan’s appointee in Tel Aviv and de-facto ambassador, Abby Lee, has been busy aiding hostage families, adopting the most affected kibbutzim in southern Israel, and volunteering with farmers. Taiwan recently pledged more than half a million dollars to Israel for critical initiatives, including medical and communications supplies for local municipalities. This follows earlier aid from Taiwan to an organization helping Israeli soldiers and families immediately after the October 7 attack.

The reasons why are not hard to fathom:

In many ways, Taiwan sees a reflection of itself in Israel—two vibrant democracies facing threats from hostile neighbors. Both nations wield substantial economic and technological prowess, and both heavily depend on U.S. military exports and diplomacy. Taipei also sees Israel as a “role model” for what Taiwan should aspire to be, citing its unwavering determination and capabilities to defend itself.

On a deeper level, Taiwanese leaders seem to view Israel’s war with Hamas and Iran as an extension of a greater struggle between democracy and autocracy.

Gering urges Israel to reciprocate these expressions of friendship and to take into account that “China has been going above and beyond to demonize the Jewish state in international forums.” Above all, he writes, Jerusalem should “take a firmer stance against China’s support for Hamas and Iran-backed terrorism, exposing the hypocrisy and repression that underpin its vision for a new global order.”

Read more at Atlantic Council

More about: Israel diplomacy, Israel-China relations, Palestinian Authority, Taiwan