In his Yom HaShoah address on Sunday, Benjamin Netanyahu responded to reports that the International Criminal Court (ICC) might be getting ready to issue arrest warrants for Israeli commanders and politicians. Neither Washington nor Jerusalem recognize ICC jurisdiction in Israel or Gaza, but the court’s prosecutor, Karim Khan, believes otherwise. Arsen Ostrovsky and John Spencer explain why going through with a case against Israel would, as Netanyahu put it, leave an “indelible stain” an international law:

The ICC was established in 2002 as “a court of last resort,” with the primary goal of ending impunity for those accused of the most heinous of crimes, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. It was never intended to be applied in the Orwellian circumstances of prosecuting Israeli leaders as they defend the Jewish state against the murderers and rapists of Hamas and seek to bring back hostages held captive by the terror group in Gaza.

The IDF has gone to unprecedented lengths, not seen in the history of modern warfare, to abide by the laws of war and avoid harm to civilians, even when doing so has put the IDF’s own soldiers at risk. This has included warning of impending attacks and creating safe corridors for civilians to evacuate through. They have done this while continuing to facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid and supplies, including more than 25,000 aid trucks to date, notwithstanding Hamas continuing to intercept and syphon much of this aid.

Not only is there absolutely no legal basis to issue arrest warrants against Israeli leaders, doing so now would only reward Hamas and unleash a further firestorm of anti-Semitism.

The U.S., and indeed all Western allies, cannot stand idly by now as the court is dragged into irredeemable disrepute. This is not the time for quiet, timid diplomacy. It must be made clear, in no uncertain terms, that if Khan chooses to proceed with issuing warrants, it will be the death knell of the court’s very legitimacy.

While the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has never been friendly to Hamas, his government has objected strenuously to the Israeli campaign in the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip. Haisam Hassanein explains why:

Cairo has long been playing a double game, holding Hamas terrorists near while simultaneously trying to appear helpful to the United States and Israel. Israel taking control of Rafah threatens Egypt’s ability to exploit the chaos in Gaza, both to generate profits for regime insiders and so Cairo can pose as an indispensable mediator and preserve access to U.S. money and arms.

Egyptian security officials have looked the other way while Hamas and other Palestinian militants dug tunnels on the Egyptian-Gaza border. That gave Cairo the ability to use the situation in Gaza as a tool for regional influence and to ensure Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would not be eclipsed by regional competitors such as Qatar and Turkey.

Some elements close to the Sisi regime have benefited from Hamas control over Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Media reports indicate an Egyptian company run by one of Sisi’s close allies is making hundreds of millions of dollars by taxing Gazans fleeing the current conflict.

Moreover, writes Judith Miller, the Gaza war has been a godsend to the entire Egyptian economy, which was in dire straits last fall. Since October 7, the International Monetary Fund has given the country a much-needed injection of cash, since the U.S. and other Western countries believe it is a necessary intermediary and stabilizing force. Cairo therefore sees the continuation of the war, rather than an Israeli victory, as most desirable. Hassanein concludes:

Adding to its financial incentive, the Sisi regime views the Rafah crossing as a crucial card in preserving Cairo’s regional standing. Holding it increases Egypt’s relevance to countries that want to send aid to the Palestinians and ensures Washington stays quiet about Egypt’s gross human-rights violations so it can maintain a stable flow of U.S. assistance and weaponry. . . . No serious effort to turn the page on Hamas will yield the desired results without cutting this umbilical cord between the Sisi regime and Hamas.