Benjamin Kerstein argues that, especially in Europe, the rising tide of violent anti-Semitism—which he terms the “global pogrom”—can be countered successfully by a vigorous and coordinated response:

The most important thing for Israelis, American Jews, and indeed everyone to understand about the global pogrom is that [it] is strikingly vulnerable. Practically everything it does, from hate speech to physical violence to murder, is patently illegal. Many of these crimes also leave pogromists and their supporters open to civil penalties, such as the favorite pogromist tactic of destroying property. And, of course, the pogrom violates the civil rights of citizens living in countries where civil rights are ostensibly sacrosanct. Indeed, to a striking extent, the pogrom is most vulnerable to the weapon the relevant authorities are most frightened to use—namely, the enforcement of their own laws.

Even more important, perhaps, is the fact that—contrary to its portrayal in much of the media—pogroms are not the work of “random” individuals. . . . The mob that attacked and almost breached the gates of the Synagogue de la Roquette in Paris last summer, for example, did not emerge from a vacuum. It broke off from a much larger anti-Israel demonstration nearby. Such demonstrations do not happen spontaneously. They require money, organization, and equipment that only specific groups can provide. . . .

Since even those demonstrations that [do] not descend into violence [are] marked by hate speech and incitement to violence, both of which are completely illegal in most European countries, all of the organizations involved in these incidents are exposed to civil and criminal penalties.

Robert Clark explains why the resumption of hostilities is both just and necessary:

These latest Israeli strikes come after weeks of consistent Palestinian provocation; they have repeatedly broken the terms of the cease-fire which they claimed they were so desperate for. There have been numerous [unsuccessful] bus bombings near Tel Aviv and Palestinian-instigated clashes in the West Bank. Fifty-nine Israeli hostages are still held in captivity.

In fact, Hamas and their Palestinian supporters . . . have always known that they can sit back, parade dead Israeli hostages live on social media, and receive hundreds of their own convicted terrorists and murderers back in return. They believed they could get away with the October 7 pogrom.

One hopes Hamas’s leaders will get the message. Meanwhile, many inside and outside Israel seem to believe that, by resuming the fighting, Jerusalem has given up on rescuing the remaining hostages. But, writes Ron Ben-Yishai, this assertion misunderstands the goals of the present campaign. “Experience within the IDF and Israeli intelligence,” Ben-Yishai writes, “has shown that such pressure is the most effective way to push Hamas toward flexibility.” He outlines two other aims:

The second objective was to signal to Hamas that Israel is not only targeting its military wing—the terror army that was the focus of previous phases of the war up until the last cease-fire—but also its governance structure. This was demonstrated by the targeted elimination of five senior officials from Hamas’s political and civilian administration. . . . The strikes also served as a message to mediators, particularly Egypt, that Israel opposes Hamas remaining in any governing or military capacity in post-war Gaza.

The third objective was to create intense military pressure, coordinated with the U.S., on all remaining elements of the Shiite “axis of resistance,” including Yemen’s Houthis, Hamas, and Iran.