A recent Israeli attack on a Hizballah convoy in Syria killed high-ranking members of the terrorist organization and an Iranian general. Although Hizballah has issued the usual threats of revenge, Walter Russell Mead argues that Israel has the clear upper hand:

Spread thin in Syria, and with all its combat energy focused on propping up [Bashar] al-Assad, Hizballah is probably not ready to take on the Israelis in a big way. But if Hizballah follows through with its threats and responds to the Israeli attack with a counterattack, the inevitable devastating Israeli response will degrade Hizballah’s war-making capacity and quite possibly tilt the battle in Syria against the [Hizballah-Assad-Iran alliance]. . . .

The Israeli strike [also] leaves Iran with nothing but ugly choices. The war in Syria is turning into a war of attrition, and the combination of sanctions and a collapsing oil price make it harder for Iran to keep propping up its clients. Serious hostilities between Hizballah and Israel would likely change the balance of power in Syria, further undercutting Assad, and inflicting damage on Hizballah that Iran will be hard put to make good.

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.