After seventeen months of dithering, the U.S. has released military aid to Egypt that had been withheld following current president Abdel Fatah al-Sisi’s seizure of power. The White House believed that it could use the aid as an incentive for democratic reforms in Egypt. Instead, writes Eric Trager, the policy backfired and has only undermined American influence:

[T]he administration cannot decide whether Egypt is a strategic partner that should be generously supported, or a brutal autocracy that should be denied aid until it pursues a more democratic path. And so, from October 2013 through March 2015 . . . the administration effectively treated Egypt as both. . . .

The administration’s painted-in-gray policy utterly confused Cairo, which is confronting multiple threats on multiple fronts, and therefore views things in black-and-white terms. The July 2013 ouster of Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohamed Morsi locked the Egyptian government in a violent, life-and-death struggle with the Brotherhood. . . . Meanwhile, the Egyptian military began a major offensive against Sinai-based jihadis in September 2013, and launched a series of airstrikes against jihadis in Libya starting in August 2014. . . .

The Egyptian government . . . didn’t view the Obama administration’s withholding of F-16 fighter jets as an affirmation of Washington’s commitment to democracy. Rather, Cairo saw the move as a significant blow to its long-term security at perhaps the most dangerous moment in contemporary Middle Eastern history. . . .

As a result, Washington’s influence with Cairo waned. Egypt blew off the administration’s criticism of its strikes against jihadis in Libya, rejected Washington’s offer of counterterrorism training, and will likely purchase S-300 surface-to-air missiles from Russia—a weapons system that would undercut Israel’s qualitative military edge, which the U.S. is legally committed to maintaining.

While the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has never been friendly to Hamas, his government has objected strenuously to the Israeli campaign in the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip. Haisam Hassanein explains why:

Cairo has long been playing a double game, holding Hamas terrorists near while simultaneously trying to appear helpful to the United States and Israel. Israel taking control of Rafah threatens Egypt’s ability to exploit the chaos in Gaza, both to generate profits for regime insiders and so Cairo can pose as an indispensable mediator and preserve access to U.S. money and arms.

Egyptian security officials have looked the other way while Hamas and other Palestinian militants dug tunnels on the Egyptian-Gaza border. That gave Cairo the ability to use the situation in Gaza as a tool for regional influence and to ensure Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would not be eclipsed by regional competitors such as Qatar and Turkey.

Some elements close to the Sisi regime have benefited from Hamas control over Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Media reports indicate an Egyptian company run by one of Sisi’s close allies is making hundreds of millions of dollars by taxing Gazans fleeing the current conflict.

Moreover, writes Judith Miller, the Gaza war has been a godsend to the entire Egyptian economy, which was in dire straits last fall. Since October 7, the International Monetary Fund has given the country a much-needed injection of cash, since the U.S. and other Western countries believe it is a necessary intermediary and stabilizing force. Cairo therefore sees the continuation of the war, rather than an Israeli victory, as most desirable. Hassanein concludes:

Adding to its financial incentive, the Sisi regime views the Rafah crossing as a crucial card in preserving Cairo’s regional standing. Holding it increases Egypt’s relevance to countries that want to send aid to the Palestinians and ensures Washington stays quiet about Egypt’s gross human-rights violations so it can maintain a stable flow of U.S. assistance and weaponry. . . . No serious effort to turn the page on Hamas will yield the desired results without cutting this umbilical cord between the Sisi regime and Hamas.